d. When the Second Court for Criminal Matters of Pichincha conducted the full trial proceeding, it found Mr. Eusebio Domingo Revelles guilty and only reiterated verbatim what the Fourth Chamber for Criminal Matters of the Superior Court of Justice had previously held to the effect that in giving the initial statement before the judge “he attempted to circumvent his involvement in and responsibility for the criminal offense that is the subject of the instant proceeding […]”. e. Lastly, in ruling on the “confirmation” of judgment, the Fourth Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice found responsibility based on its consideration that the pre-indictment testimonial evidence made it possible to infer Mr. Domingo Revelles’ responsibility in the offenses, and even though in his initial testimony before a judge “[…]he claims to not know about any of the facts appearing in the police report and in the order instituting trial proceedings […],” there are versions of the facts in the “pre-indictment statements” implicating Mr. Revelles. 214. The Commission notes that the conduct of the authorities in validating the pre-indictment statements to establish the responsibility of Mr. Revelles is explained by the way in which the principle of the presumption of innocence is defined within the framework of criminal proceedings in Ecuador, which at that time, regulated drug-related offenses. Thus, the Commission notes that when Mr. Eusebio Domingo Revelles contested the order opening the full trial proceedings, the Fourth Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice noted that Article 116 of the Law on Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances was applicable to this instance, and this provision of the law established a “presumption of guilt, as long as the body of the crime [corpus delicti] was justified.” 215. The Commission notes that said provision of the law, which inverts the burden of proof placing it on the defendant, was examined by expert witness Reinaldo Cavacci before the Inter-American Court in the case of Acosta Calderón v. Ecuador, establishing that under this provision “the indictee was imposed the duty of proving their innocence” and that “while this norm was in force, it meant the violation of the presumption of innocence of many people prosecuted for crimes related to the trafficking and possession of narcotics and psychotropic substances .”192 216. The Commission is aware that the situation of incompatibility of this norm with the principle of the presumption of innocence was subsequently recognized by the Constitutional Court of Ecuador in finding it unconstitutional.193 However, said norm was applied by the Fourth Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice to this specific case in violation of the principle of the presumption of innocence set forth in Article 8.2 of the American Convention in connection with the obligations established in Articles 1.1 and 2 of the same instrument, to the detriment of Mr. Eusebio Domingo Revelles. 3. Reasonable period of time for the criminal proceedings 217. The Court has established that “the reasonableness of the period of time mentioned in Article 8.1 of the Convention must be assessed in relation to the total time demanded by criminal proceedings. This time period runs from the first procedural act addressed to a specific person allegedly responsible for a given offense, until final and non-appealable judgment is rendered.”194 In order to determine whether a criminal proceeding was conducted within a reasonable period of time, as defined under Article 8.1 of the Convention, the Inter-American Court has taken into account four elements: a) the complexity of the matter; b) the judicial 192IA Court of HR, Case of Acosta Calderón v. Ecuador. Judgment of June 24, 2005. Series C No. 129, para. 44. a). 193In Judgment of December 16, 1997. See in this regard, IA Court of HR, Case of Acosta Calderón v. Ecuador. Judgment of June 24, 2005. Series C No. 129, para. 44. a). 194 IA Court of HR, Case of Bayarri v. Argentina. Judgment of October 30, 2008. Series C No, 187, para. 107; Case of Baldeón García v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of April 6, 2006. Series C No. 147, para. 150; IA Court of HR, Case of Genie Lacayo v. Nicaragua, Judgment of January 29, 1997, para. 77. 50