THE SERRANO CRUZ SISTERS V. EL SALVADOR Judgment on merits, reparations, and costs DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MANUEL E. VENTURA ROBLES ON THE THIRD OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1. I dissent from the majority opinion in the case of the Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, stated in the third operative paragraph. According to this, the Court did not rule on the alleged violations of the rights of the family, the right to a name and the rights of the child because, in the Court's opinion, it lacked jurisdiction to rule on possible violations originating from facts or acts that occurred before June 6, 1995, or which began to be executed before that date, since it had decided this in its judgment on preliminary objections in this case of November 23, 2004. 2. In my opinion, if the Court was obliged to limit its jurisdiction in this case owing to the way in which the State of El Salvador accepted the Court's contentious jurisdiction pursuant to Article 62 of the American Convention on Human Rights, it has imposed a limitation on itself in this judgment, because it has accepted a restrictive interpretation that adversely affects the victims. This has deprived the Court of the historic possibility of ruling on the violation of the rights of the family, the right to a name and the rights of the child in a case concerning the search for individuals who disappeared when they were children in the context of an internal armed conflict and, consequently, of ruling on the right to identity of such persons. 3. I consider that the Court imposed a limitation on itself in this case, because, if most of the judges ruled in favor of autonomous violations of the American Convention occurring after El Salvador's acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction, specifically violations of Articles 8, 25 and 5, they should also have declared that Articles 17, 18 and 19 had been violated since, following the date of acceptance, several facts have occurred related to the violation of the latter provisions, in the context of the lack of a domestic investigation to determine what happened to Ernestina and Erlinda Serrano Cruz. In particular, these facts are closely related to the violations of Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention (access to justice and due process) which have been declared in the judgment. The violations of these articles were declared owing basically to violation of the principle of reasonable time and because the habeas corpus procedure and the criminal proceedings concerning the disappearance of Ernestina and Erlinda Serrano Cruz were not effective in tracing their whereabouts, or investigating and punishing those responsible. In other words, in this case, the logical and necessary consequence of declaring that Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention had been violated was to declare that Articles 5, 17, 18 and 19 had also been violated, and not merely Article 5, as I will explain below. 4. In the instant case, the State authorities' lack of due diligence in processing the petition for habeas corpus and the criminal proceedings meant that the information needed to find Ernestina and Erlinda could not be obtained. Consequently, should they be alive, it impeded reunification with their biological family and also, if applicable and if they so wished, re-establishment of the given name and surnames assigned by their parents, thus constituting the violation, to the detriment of Ernestina and Erlinda and their next of kin, of the rights of the family