62 natural death, accidental death, suicide and homicide.85 The Court further notes that: a) the crime scene must be exhaustively investigated and b) autopsies, as well as analyses of skeletal remains, must be rigorously performed by competent professionals, employing the most appropriate procedures.86 150. Turning to the instant case, the proven facts indicate that the civilian police began an investigation into the November 29, 1986 events at Moiwana Village in 1989, over two years after the attack (supra paragraph 86(25)). During March and April of 1989, Inspector Herman Gooding, who was in charge of said investigation, questioned several suspects and arrested at least two individuals, Frits Moesel and Orlando Swedo (supra paragraph 86(25)). Nevertheless, shortly after Mr. Swedo was placed in state custody, a fully-armed contingent of military police arrived at the police station and forcibly obtained his release (supra paragraph 86(26)). Following the siege of the civilian police station, Army Commander Desire Bouterse issued a statement, by which he confirmed the following: a) that the operation in Moiwana Village was a military action which he himself had ordered; b) that he would not allow military operations to be investigated by the civilian police; and c) that he had required the release of Mr. Swedo (supra paragraph 86(27)). 151. The official investigation was then abandoned until May of 1993, when Moiwana ’86 discovered a mass grave near Moiwana Village and notified the Office of the Attorney General (supra paragraph 86(31)). The grave site was then visited on two occasions – May 29 and June 9, 1993 – by military and civilian police, a pathologist and Moiwana ’86 (supra paragraph 86(31)). The team uncovered human remains, which were taken to Paramaribo for further analysis (supra paragraph 86(31)). Subsequently, however, state authorities reported only that the remains corresponded to five to seven adults and two to three children; the identification of the corpses or further information regarding the grave site have not been provided by the State (supra paragraph 86(31)). 152. The Court observes with grave concern that only the limited investigative steps described above have been performed by Suriname since the events of November 29, 1986. Furthermore, the State has maintained this posture of indifference despite a directive adopted on December 19, 1995 by the National Assembly of Suriname, requesting the Executive Branch “to instigate an immediate investigation” into human rights violations committed during the military regime (supra paragraph 86(32)). 153. In efforts to explain the troublesome lack of results, the State has remarked that the political climate in Suriname after the 1986 attack prevented “an independent and impartial investigation,” since “the position of power held by the former military leaders had not yet ended and […] democracy was still not stable.” In this regard, the Court acknowledges the difficult circumstances endured by the nation of Suriname in its struggle for democracy. Nevertheless, country conditions, however difficult, generally may not release a State Party to the American 85 Cf. Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez, supra note 78, paras. 127 and 132; and U.N. Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, U.N. Doc E/ST/CSDHA/.12 (1991). 86 Cf. Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez, supra note 78, paras. 127 and 132; and U.N. Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, U.N. Doc E/ST/CSDHA/.12 (1991).