8 25. Protection obligations arise directly from International Law and are governed by the relevant provisions of human rights treaties and the general principles of International Law. If all criticism –referred to above– by the most perceptive international-law scholars to the alleged distinction between obligations of conduct and obligations of result took into consideration how inadequate such distinction was to determine the very own origin of the international responsibility of the State in a specific case, then I find such distinction even more inadequate for a determination of the consequence of the original engagement of responsibility, i.e. its implementation with the resulting duty to make reparation. In turn, such duty represents a true obligation of result. 26. To sum up and as a conclusion, the conduct of a State Party to a human rights treaty needs to conform to the result imposed by the conventional obligations of protection. In the International Law of Human Rights, it is not the result that is conditioned by a State’s conduct but, conversely, it is the conduct of the State that is conditioned by the attainment of the result sought by the protection provisions. In ordering reparation, the Inter-American Court does not always go into detail regarding the conduct that the State should observe but it does, however, determine that the respondent State is required to achieve the result ordered by it: due reparation to the victims. 27. For instance, Article 68(2) of the American Convention provides that "that part of a judgment that stipulates compensatory damages may be executed in the country concerned in accordance with domestic procedure governing the execution of judgments against the state". If the domestic procedure is insufficient or inadequate to provide reparation, the State is then required to take the necessary measures to make up for such insufficiency or inadequacy and achieve the result sought, namely the reparation. This is a conventional obligation of result that conditions the conduct of the State. The conduct must be such that it leads to the fulfillment of the obligation of result. The conduct is an integral part of the duty to repair, which is an obligation of result. 28. The authorization embodied in Article 68(2) of the Convention, which applies to monetary reparation only, does not mean that the State is not allowed to engage in such conduct as it may deem appropriate. Its conduct is conditioned by the obligation of result, which consists in providing reparation. As regards non-monetary reparation, it must be given in the terms of the Judgment rendered by the Inter-American Court. There is no question that any reparation – monetary or non-monetary – must be made effective as an obligation of result. This is the conclusion clearly inferred from Article 68(1) of the Convention, under which: "The States Parties to the Convention undertake to comply with the judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties." 29. Otherwise, the State might claim that, in spite of its proper conduct, it has been prevented from adequately fulfilling its duty of reparation as a result of domestic law difficulties or insufficiencies - and this would be inadmissible. I find it obvious that such duty is not one merely of conduct: it truly is an obligation of result. The Court could not possibly hold a case over and close the file on it just because the State acted properly; it may only do so once the result, full reparation to the victims (and once the victims, their next of kin and all interested parties and parties involved in the proceedings before the Court have been consulted), has been achieved. Otherwise, we would be faced with a legal formality leading to an absurdity. To conclude, when dealing with a peremptory right such as the international protection of human persons, conventional obligations of protection are inescapable and imposed per se, and they are necessarily obligations of result.