81. In short, the Commission considers that this lack of information and its effects on the exercise of her right to defense constituted a violation of the rights to be sufficiently informed about the grounds for the charges against her and to adequate means to exercise her defense, which are recognized in Articles 8.2.b and 8.2.c of the American Convention. Concerning the violation of the right to sufficient justification of decisions, the principle of legality, and the right to be presumed innocent 82. On this point, the Commission will analyze the decision by which the Human Rights Ombudsman ordered Mrs. Maldonado's dismissal. The purpose is to determine if that decision respected the right to sufficient justification of decisions, the principle of legality, and the right to be presumed innocent. 83. The text of decision No. 81-2000 of the Human Rights Ombudsman suggests that her dismissal was for causes established in paragraphs 4 and 15 of Article 74 of the aforementioned institution's Personnel Regulations. As was noted above, the right to be presumed innocent is also applicable to noncriminal punitive proceedings. Accordingly, the Human Rights Ombudsman had the obligation to verify if Mrs. Maldonado had committed those causes and to reflect both its factual and its legal analysis in its justification. On this point, the European Court has stressed the need in dismissal proceedings to perform a “minute and detailed analysis” of the charges.89 84. the following: The Commission notes that the Ombudsman’s entire explanation of reasons is confined to That the allegations against Mrs. Olga Yolanda Maldonado Ordóñez amount to a series of legal acts and disputes of a personal nature whose outcome could seriously harm the institution of the Human Rights Ombudsman because of Mrs. Maldonado Ordóñez’ employment relationship with the institution, by virtue of the fact that she is accused of falsifying notarized document No. 470 dated October 11, 1994, ... allegedly by notary Mariano Orozco de León, on which two signatures appear when there should be three, according to the authenticated plain copy of said notarized document, all of which creates grave doubts as to its authenticity, it having the obligation to avert, both within and outside the institution, the commission of acts contrary to the law, decency, and moral conventions that might undermine its prestige.90 85. Based on the Ombudsman's words above, the basis of the decision were the "allegations" and the alleged "commission of acts contrary to the law.” The State also recognized in the proceedings before the IACHR that the “causal act” was neither reported to nor investigated by the judicial authorities. This, in itself, is a violation of the right to be presumed innocent recognized in Article 8.2 of the American Convention. 86. As regards the principle of legality, the Commission notes that the cause of disciplinary measures established in the provision that was ultimately applied in respect of the possible harm to "the institution" is literally linked to the actual commission of criminal offenses or unlawful acts and not the mere probability thereof. This means that invoking this cause requires that the facts that supported instituting the proceeding be proven and actually classed as unlawful acts or criminal offenses by the competent authorities for the matter in question. As was mentioned above, that did not happen in this case as the Ombudsman based his decision on the “allegations," in violation, not only of the right to be presumed innocent, but also of the principle of legality recognized in Article 9 of the Convention. 89 ECHR, Obst v. Germany Application No. 425/03. Judgment of December 23, 2010, para. 49; Schütch v. Germany Application No. 1620/03. Judgment of December 23, 2010, para. 59. 90 2002. Annex 2. Decision No. 81-2000 of the Human Rights Ombudsman, May 16, 2000. Appendix 1 to the initial petition of July 15, 17