repeatedly appeared at the Office of the Sixth Prosecutor in order to “familiarize themselves with the contents of the case brought against the accused.” 71. With regard to the petitioners’ allegation that “in general…the right of the defense to question witnesses present in court was violated […]” (see supra III A), the State argues that the petitioners confuse “evidence introduced in court during the trial stage with the “elements of conviction” presented in the Office of the Prosecutor during the investigation phase. In that regard, the State contends that the questioning of witnesses conducted by the Office of the Prosecutor is not the equivalent of testimony given in court during the trial stage in accordance with the provisions of Articles 35555 and 35656 of the COPP. Once the identity of a person called to testify by the Office of the Prosecutor is known, the defense may request that the Public Ministry ask the witness certain questions, providing it demonstrates the relevance, need, usefulness and connection to the investigation.57 The State points out that in Brewer Carías’ case, the defense did not request the Public Ministry to do so. The defense must show the relevance, need, usefulness and connection to the investigation of the persons it suggests the Office of the Prosecutor should interview during the investigation phase, and it may request that certain questions be asked as long as they meet the same requirements persons being interviewed. The State contends that the attorneys for Brewer Carías did not meet this requirement. It points out that during interviews at the Office of the Prosecutor, the defense may actively participate in that investigation (which is not a proceeding to enter evidence for trial) which will be reflected in the record of the interview. The State also points out that if testimony or evidence from the investigative proceeding is admitted by the Court of Control and it then progresses on to the Trial Court, it is at that point that the defense may question and cross-examine witnesses and can control the process of witness examination. The State points out that the present case has not reached the trial phase and, therefore, the defense will have the opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses whose testimony has been admitted by the Court of Control in the intermediate phase. Thus, the State comes to the conclusion that the petitioners confuse58 the investigation phase, the intermediate phase, and the trial phase in Venezuelan Criminal Procedure. 72. The State alleges that Allan Brewer Carías faced the criminal proceedings against him, in liberty, without an arrest warrant issued in his name, until July 14, 2006. In that sense, the State refutes the petitioners’ allegation contending that: "[…] the State tries to deny Dr. Brewer Carias his physical freedom, denies his right to stand trial in liberty and restricts his freedom of movement by issuing an order for his preventive detention which is not supported by any immediate need and which does not meet minimum national and international legal standards to justify such an exceptional measure.” The State emphasizes that from April 12, 2002, until he left the country on June 2, 2006, Allan Brewer Carías had enjoyed absolute liberty and The State cites Article 355 of the COPP. Witnesses. “Next, the presiding judge shall proceed to summon the witnesses, one by one: first, those who offered themselves to the Public Ministry; next, those proposed by the complainant; and, lastly, those for the accused. The presiding judge may alter this order when it is not considered convenient to furthering the clarification of the acts. Before making a statement, witnesses may not communicate amongst themselves or with other persons or see, hear or be informed of what is occurring in the proceedings. Afterwards, the presiding judge shall decide if the proceedings continue in the pre-trial chamber or if they are withdrawn. Nonetheless, the non-compliance of the lack of communication will not impede the witness's statement, but the tribunal shall appreciate this circumstance when it evaluates the evidence.” Submission from the Ministry of Popular Power for Foreign Affairs AEGV/000394 on August 25, 2009, page 35. 56 The State cites Article 356 of the COPP. Examination. “After taking oath and asking the expert or witness to identify themselves and state the general circumstances to appreciate their report or statement, the presiding judge will allow the person to address what he knows about the proposed event as an object of evidence. After the account has been given, the judge will allow direct examination. The person who proposed the examination will begin; then the other parties will continue in the order the presiding judge considers convenient. The defense should be the last to examine. Later, the tribunal may question the expert or the witness. The presiding judge will moderate the examination and will prevent the deponent from answering leading, catch or impertinent questions. The judge will also attempt to ensure the examination takes place without undue pressure and without offending the dignity of the persons. The parties may request that the presiding judges' decisions be repealed when they limit the examination or they may object to questions posed. The experts and witnesses will express the reasons behind their information and the origin of their knowledge.” Submission from the Ministry of Popular Power for Foreign Affairs AEGV/000394 on August 25, 2009, page 35. 57 The State cites Article 305, 125 numeral 5 and 131 of the COPP. Submission from the Ministry of Popular Power for Foreign Affairs AEGV/000394 on August 25, 2009, page 38. 58 The State indicates that said confusion is also reflected in the citation of the petitioners in Report No. 85/99 of Case No. 11.258 (Figueredo Planchart), which specifically refers to the acts undertaken before a tribunal and not during the investigation. 55 16