35 No. 834 of July 15, 1978 establishes that “if the same case is pending before two courts of equal rank and both are competent to hear the case, the second court petitioned in the case must cede to the other if one of the parties so requests.” 144. In the instant case, the Commission observes that, despite having requested the relevant decisions of the military courts, the State never submitted them. In that regard, the IACHR observes that it only has the operative paragraphs of the main decisions issued by the military courts but not the reasoning followed by the courts to reach those conclusions. Nonetheless, the IACHR notes that the reading of other documents indicates –and this was confirmed by the State in its allegations before the Commission—that the crimes committed by members of the military with regard to the instant case were considered by national authorities to be “crimes committed in the exercise of duty.” In fact, the Commission notes that in the proceedings before the Commission, the understanding of the State has been that the Supreme Court had denied the appeal motion for transfer of jurisdiction filed by the relatives of the victims based on the fact that the military courts were competent to hear the offenses because they were “crimes committed in the performance of duty.” In the opinion of the Commission, the reasoning is 156 not evident in the decision of the Supreme Court with regard to the instant case (supra) . Notwithstanding the preceding, the IACHR notes that the State has consistently argued that the military courts were the competent jurisdiction because the offenses were committed in the performance of duty. Therefore, in the instant case, the Commission will consider that to be the reasoning of the Dominican authorities to submit the case to the military courts. 145. With regard to military jurisdiction, the IACHR recalls that this must be applied only when there is an attempt against the legal rights of the military with regard to the specific responsibilities for the 157 defense and security of the State, and never to investigate human rights violations. In that regard, the Commission has maintained in various opportunities that: [M]ilitary justice should be used only to judge active-duty military officers for the alleged commission of service-related offenses, strictly speaking. Human rights violations must be investigated, tried, and punished in keeping with the law, by the regular criminal courts. Inverting the jurisdiction in cases of human rights violations should not be allowed, as this undercuts judicial guarantees, under an illusory image of the effectiveness of military justice, with grave institutional 158 consequences, which in fact call into question the civilian courts and the rule of law. 146. In that regard, the Inter-American Court has established that: The Tribunal considers it appropriate to state that it has repeatedly established that the military criminal jurisdiction in democratic states, in times of peace, has tended to be reduced and has even disappeared, reason for which, if a State conserves it, its use shall be minimum, as strictly 156 The decision of the Supreme Court of Justice denied the amparo recourse lodged by the relatives of the victims executed to transfer the investigation of the facts to the ordinary jurisdiction based on provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in ordinary jurisdiction which establish that when “the same case is pending before two courts of equal rank and equally competent to hear it,” the first jurisdiction to hear the case should conduct the investigation of the facts. That is to say, that reasoning indicates that the incidents in which the military members were involved could have been heard in ordinary courts, which, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, was also competent, but ruled that since the military jurisdiction was the first to hear the facts, the military jurisdiction should continue with the investigation. In that regard, the Commission notes that according to the evidence included in the case file, in a similar case of jurisdictional conflict between the military and civil jurisdictions –which by analogy was made equal to the military– the Supreme Court of Justice of the Dominican Republic issued a judgment at the end of 2001, in which, contrary to the instant case, it determined the special scope of the military jurisdiction and remitted the investigation to the ordinary jurisdiction. The IACHR ignores the reasons for the different criteria of the Supreme Court. In that regard see, Judgment of December 26, 2001, available at http://www.suprema.gov.do/novedades/sentencias/tyson.htm In that decision, the court considered that military personnel “should not be subtracted from ordinary jurisdiction other than for exceptional circumstances which inescapably leads to the conclusion that during normal times, defined not by a state of war but of peace, military and police tribunals should not hear, in principle, cases other than those of special offenses which are of a purely military or police nature, committed by military or police personnel,” and for all other offenses, such as “those committed in the exercise […] of their duties regardless of where they were committed […] military and police tribunals are not competent to hear them in times of peace.” Consequently, the Supreme Court of justice decided to remit the investigation to ordinary jurisdiction. 157 IA Court H.R., Case Palamara Iribarne. Judgment dated November 22, 2005. Series C No. 135. par. 132 158 IACHR. Report No. 2/06 (Merits). Case 12,130, Miguel Orlando Muñoz Guzmán v Mexico, February 28, 2006, para. 84.