4 12. Following the same line of thought, I wish to make two brief additional points in connection with the American Convention on Human Rights. In the first place, the control of conventionality lies, in my opinion and as already explained, with both domestic and international judges (i.e. the members of the Inter-American Court). It is for this reason that I have always found myself at odds, to some extent, with the pure renvoi of some issue pending before the Court to the domestic organs for resolution, as I consider that, whenever possible, the Court itself should provide such resolution. Second, the general obligation embodied in Article 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights opens the door to its “constitutionalization,” i.e. the “constitutionalization” of an international convention (which is entirely different from the so-called internationalization of constitutional law and much more advanced than it). III. Conventional Obligations of Protection as Obligations of Result. 13. In my Separate Opinion to the Judgment rendered by this Court in the Case of Baldeón-García v. Peru (Merits and Reparations, of Apr. 6, 2006), I dissented from the line of reasoning taken by the majority of the Court, according to which state obligations to prevent, investigate and punish perpetrators would be nothing but "best efforts” obligations, “rather than [obligations] to ensure results." Unlike the majority of the Court, in that Separate Opinion I stated that: “In my opinion, the right to fair trial is also part of the realm of the international jus cogens. As I explained in my Separate Opinion on the recent Case of Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia (2006), ‘The impossibility to segregate Article 25 from Article 8, both of the American Convention (supra) involves the need to consider the right to fair trial, understood as full access to justice, as part of the realm of the jus cogens, i.e. the intangibility of all legal safeguards belong to the realm of the jus cogens as set forth in Articles 25 and 8, considered as a whole. (...) (...) the Court could -and should- have made qualitative progress on precedent setting. I dare nurse the hope that the Court will do so as soon as possible if it effectively continues supporting its avant-garde precedents, instead of attempting to limit them- and will courageously further on the progress made based on the aforementioned Advisory Opinion n. 18 aimed at continuously broadening the material scope of the jus cogens’ (para. 64-65). Also in my recent Separate Opinion (paras. 52-55) in the case of LópezÁlvarez v. Honduras (2006), I restated my idea that the right to justice (the right to fair trial lato sensu) is a compulsory element of the jus cogens. The Court could –and should- have established so in the instant case; instead, it repeated prior obiter dicta. Thus, the Court lost the opportunity to step forward regarding its precedent setting process. I will go even further. In my opinion, as I explained above, we are referring to compulsory laws; therefore, the State's obligations to prevent, investigate and punish perpetrators are not mere obligations "to act in a given manner, but not to achieve a given result," as stated by the Court in paragraph 93 of this Judgment. I dissent in this reasoning from the majority of the Court. As I indicated in my Separate Opinion (para. 23) in the recent Judgment of the Court of March 29, 2006, in the city of Brasilia, in the Case of Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay: ‘(...) The State’s obligations require it to act diligently and to achieve a given result, not merely to act in a given manner (such as adopting insufficient and ineffective legislative measures). Indeed, the examination of the difference between obligations to act in a given manner and to achieve a given result8 has, in general, been carried out under a theoretical approach, assuming variations in the conduct of the State and even a succession of acts by the 8 . Especially based on the work of the United Nations Commission on the International Responsibility of States.