-46went to work only to find that the corporation was closed. She and her co-workers were denied access to the premises. She did not receive any written notice when she was dismissed. She was not informed of the institution of any proceedings to wind up the corporation. ESMLL representatives told them that “there [was] no work for [them].” She “supported [her] household” and she had five children. They filed an appeal for legal protection and the Peruvian Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional Court) sustained it and ordered their reinstatement. So far such reinstatement has not been carried out, nor has she received any compensation after she was dismissed from the ESMLL. She derives her income from washing clothes, since she has not found any formal employment. b) Proposed by the State 2. César Lino Azabache-Caracciolo, former member of the Procuraduría Anticorrupción (Office of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor) He worked for the Procuraduría Anticorrupción (Office of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor) from its creation in November 2000 until February 2002. He was in charge of the cases involving drug trafficking and human rights violations, as weel as cases involving the purchase of military equipment and well as preparing the cases of corruption involving the “Montesinos network” linked to the Judiciary and to the Office of the Attorney-General. He made reference to the creation of the Procuraduría Anticorrupción (Office of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor) as an outcome of the political crisis occurred in November 2000 in Peru, triggered by the discovery of videos evidencing corrupt relations between Montesinos-Torres, then a public official and the most important advisor of president Fujimori, and certain people in the political community, and by the discovery of undeclared accounts belonging to Montesinos-Torres. The Minister of Justice at the time had a legal team set up to handle the actions that had to be instituted against Montesinos-Torres, as it was widely known that he formally controlled the Judiciary and the Office of the Attorney-General. Since the public prosecutors were under the authority of the Attorney-General, it was deemed necessary to create a Special Prosecuting Office. He pointed out that Montesinos-Torres exerted influence over the Judiciary. In 1995 a “judicial reform” was carried out, allowing for the creation of different governmental bodies than those established by the organic laws. Interim judges were appointed by some officials of the Supreme Court of Justice, “showing signs of a network around Montesinos-Torres.” In 1997, Montesinos-Torres “orchestrated a restructuring” of the Salas de Derecho Público (Public Law Chambers) in charge of decisions on writs of habeas corpus and on appeals for legal protection [enforcement of the constitutional guarantee for protection of civil rights] cases, and he “imposed the appointment of a No. of persons later proved to have received illegal payments from Montesinos-Torres on a permanent basis.” Two court of original jurisdictions and one Sala de Derecho Público (Public Law Chamber) were created. One of the earliest pieces of evidence of the relationship between Montesinos and members of the Judiciary was a fax sent to Montesinos from the drug enforcement