10 33. In the judgment delivered in the Case of Castillo-Petruzzi, one Judge of the Court produced a Concurring Opinion in which he alluded to this matter (and others), although he did so in reference to a military court system that had failed to respect the right of appeal: “that the victim’s right to a court of second instance was not respected (because the courts that heard the case on review) did not function as tribunals that re-examine all the facts in a case, weigh the probative value of the evidence, compile any additional evidence necessary, produce, once again, a juridical assessment of the facts in question based on domestic laws and give the legal grounds for that assessment.” (Concurring opinion of Judge Carlos Vicente de Roux Rengifo, in the Judgment on the Case of Castillo-Petruzzi et al., May 30, 1999). 34. In the instant case, the remedy of cassation was used, as it is the only one that the Costa Rican procedural system provides, since the remedy of appeal –which is what the court of second instance is for- was done away with. The Court is not unmindful of the important role that the petition of cassation has had in its long history, or of how effective it has been and is to this day. However, as a rule, it is a complicated challenge procedure and not always available as a remedy for everything that is justiciable. The Court has considered the universe of issues that, under positive law, are covered by a cassation system and therefore subject to the material jurisdiction of the higher court. In the instant case, cassation does not have the scope that I described in paragraph 30 above and to which the Judgment of the Court referred to confirm the scope of Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention. It is possible that elsewhere, where the petition seeking a writ of cassation has developed differently, it may well cover points that an appeal would ordinarily address, as well as a review of legality which is the essential function of cassation. 35. I am, of course, aware that this raises important problems. There is a strong and respected trend, embodied, for example in the excellent Model Code of Criminal Procedure for Ibero-America put together by a select group of jurists, that favors doing away with the traditional two-tiered system, leaving review of judgments solely in the hands of the court of cassation. This position argues, inter alia, that two-tiered systems –a lower court and an appellate court- are costly and that the principle of procedural immediacy has to be preserved. Appellate courts do not always observe that principle, as we customarily understand it. To retain the advantages of the two-tiered system where a case is heard first by one judge and then by a collegiate body whose members collectively represent an added guarantee of a just outcome, the option that would do away with the two-tiered system would have a collegiate bench for the one court that hears the case before it goes to the court of cassation. 6. Tax exemptions 36. The Judgment in the Case of Herrera-Ulloa raises two other questions that I would like to briefly touch upon, although they have no bearing at all on those previously discussed. One has to do with the practice of ordering that none of the pecuniary reparations, expenses and costs ordered may be subject to any existing tax or any tax legislated into law at any time in the future. I understand and agree with the material sense of that order, and have therefore voted in favor of this clause: the idea, of course, is not to allow tax laws to eat into the reparations ordered, and thus defeat the purpose of pecuniary damages and leave the victim’s rights unprotected.