Regarding the operation itself of the CEH, numeral III that regulates that aspect in the corresponding Agreement of Establishment, literally states the following: “III) The works, recommendations, and report of the Commission will not individualize responsibilities or have legal purposes or effects.” It is in reference to this numeral III that speculations have been made regarding if those works, recommendations, and reports have an evidentiary value within trials or not. This judgment makes it clear they do. In any case, it is obvious that this rule on the operation of the CEH referred to the fact that said Commission could not become a court and assign responsibility to any person individually considered. C.- Lack of Jurisdiction of the Military Court. The fact that on June 10, 2008, the Military Court of the Fourth Brigade of the General Infantry “Justo Rufino Barrios”, of the municipality of Cuyotenango, department of Suchitepéquez, issued a decision stating its lack of jurisdiction to continue with the investigation diligences regarding the whereabouts of María and Josefa Tiu Tojín, responding to a request of the Public Prosecutors’ Office of the Human Rights Section of the city of Guatemala and that said military court forwarded the case file to the First Instance Court of Criminal, Narcotic, and Environmental Offenses of the Department of the Quiché, can be interpreted in two forms: the first as positive since the State of Guatemala itself, as a result of this case and after the holding of the public hearing to receive evidence, made this request and it was successful in the sense that the military 9 jurisdiction gave way, as should be, to the ordinary criminal jurisdiction. However, the second interpretation of this same fact is concerning. As clarified in paragraphs 46 and 70 of the Judgment, for more than 16 years the case of María and Josefa Tiu Tojín remained in the investigation phase, period during which there was no progress and the facts were not duly investigated by Guatemalan justice, thus materializing a clear denial of justice and maintaining, even up to this date, a complete impunity in this case. Even more so, the Court observes that this situation of impunity is characteristic of similar facts occurred during the internal armed conflict in Guatemala, becoming a determining factor that forms part of the systematic patterns that allowed the commission of grave violations to human rights during that time.” I find the content of paragraph 118 of the Judgment extremely important and relevant in what refers to the scope and limits, according to this Court, of the military criminal jurisdiction (“restrictive and exceptional scope”). Therefore, there is already jurisprudence that states that “when military justice assumes jurisdiction over a matter that should be heard by the ordinary justice, the right to a competent court and, a fortiori, the due process, which is at the same time intimately linked to the right to a fair trial itself, is affected.” (see footnote number 112 of the Judgment). These limits to the military criminal jurisdiction and its correct application must be observed by the State of Guatemala, derived from the full acknowledgment of the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and therefore the binding nature its judgments has on the Guatemalan State when it is part of a proceeding before that Court. Thus, these parameters should be seriously taken into consideration when the discussion on a new military criminal law is taken up again in Guatemala. In the meantime, the case of Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala shall also act as a parameter or reference for the Supreme Court of Justice when it carries out all the steps it must complete in order to fully comply with Decree 41-96 of the Congress of the Republic through which Article 2 of Decree 214-1878 (Military Code) was reformed and therefore finally achieve that “the military jurisdiction be applied only to the members of the armed institution that commit crimes of a 9 See paragraph 47 of the Judgment.