4 The crime described in Article 2 of Decree Law No. 25,475 is terrorism, whereas the crime described in Decree-Law No. 25,659 is aggravated terrorism, whose nomen iuris is treason. The military courts have been able to use this distinction to acquit or to decline jurisdiction in the case of persons accused of aggravated terrorism and to remand them to the regular courts, which has jurisdiction to prosecute simple terrorism. 3. Decree-Law No. 25,659 was in force on October 14 and 15, 1993, when the National Police detained the Chilean citizens. Therefore, the crime of aggravated terrorism with which they were charged was covered in the applicable law, as was the penalty it carried. At the time of their conviction, May 3, 1994, the applicable punishment was life imprisonment. For the very same reasons I concurred with some of the findings of this judgment, I do not agree with the Court’s finding that the State violated Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention. In the consideranda of the judgment, which summarizes the facts, it was shown that the Chilean citizens did have recourse to a higher court, even though this was the military justice system. For the same reasons, I must also dissent from the Court’s finding that the State violated Article 8(5) of the Convention. While criminal proceedings should be public, as Peru’s Constitution recognizes, proceedings such as those instituted in the case of the Chilean citizens, or those that ought to be instituted, cannot necessarily be public and the circumstances surrounding this case certainly fit the exception allowed under Article 8(5) of the Convention. Finally, I disagree with the Court’s finding that the State violated Article 5 of the Convention, for the following reasons: 1. In addition to the emergency provisions that Peru created to stamp out terrorist violence and further the country’s pacification, it also established sentencing guidelines for those convicted of the crime of aggravated terrorism constituting treason. These guidelines and regulations, like any others enacted in Peru, must be published in order to take effect. They thus find their way into the public domain. 2, These are the provisions that, in my judgment, the judgment should have taken into consideration, not the testimony from the attorneys of the two Chilean citizens. Theirs was a purely second-hand account, with no basis in fact, especially since the statement itself acknowledged that their knowledge of the treatment the convicted men received was pure hearsay. Fernando Vidal-Ramírez Judge ad hoc Manuel E. Ventura-Robles Secretary