3 Temptation of Christ ", regarding Chile (Judgment of 02.05.2001), in which I allowed myself to present, in my Concurring Opinion, the grounds for objective or absolute responsibility in the legal international doctrine. But not all the cases of violations of human rights are based on an objective international responsibility. 9. In my aforementioned General Course of 2005 in the Academy of International Law of La Haya, I observed that, next to said grounds for international responsibility, there are also cases of violations to human rights in which the guilt (offense), and even the dolus (when the intention is proven), are present, thus arising the aggravated international responsibility. 3 We can recall, as examples in this last sense, the cases of Myrna Mack Chang versus Guatemala (Judgment of 11.25.2003), of the Massacre of Plan de Sánchez versus Guatemala (Judgment of 04.29.2004), of the 19 Tradesmen versus Colombia (Judgment of 07.05.2004), of the Mapiripán Massacre versus Colombia (Judgment of 09.15.2005), of the Massacre of the Moiwana Community versus Suriname (Judgment of 06.15.2005), of the Ituango Massacre versus Colombia (Judgment of 07.01.2006), - in which the State’s intent to commit gross violations of human rights, or its express negligence to avoid them, were irrefutably proven. 10. In these cases, the gross breaches were perpetrated in name of the State, as a subject of International Law, and, also, in the same line of its criminal acts the facts were covered, with its aggravated international responsibility deriving from all this. In summary, and in conclusion regarding the present matter under examination, in the current general theory on the State’s international responsibility, there is still a coexistence between objective (or absolute) international responsibility and the State’s international responsibility based on guilt, and even on dolus (aggravated). II. Foundations of the International Jurisdiction. 11. I go on to the next point of my reasoning: In my Concurring Opinion in the case of Blake versus Guatemala (merits, Judgment of 01.24.1998) I already allowed myself to point out the grounds for international responsibility (conventional obligations) and of international jurisdiction. The first is of material law, being the second of a jurisdictional order. Although in the present case of Servellón García et al. versus Honduras there were no problems of a jurisdictional order, there is room here for one precision. When extending its examination of the case further on than what was object of the acknowledgment of responsibility by the State, the Court – without saying it – has exercised an inherent power to its jurisdiction. The Court seems to not have noticed that the thesis of the inherent powers strengthens its jurisdictional foundations. 12. This has been irrefutably proven in its experience in recent years, in the exercise of its functions, both advisory and contentious. With regard to the first, the Court made use, in an exemplary manner, of its inherent powers in its Advisory Opinion n. 15, on Reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Article 51 of the American Convention on Human Rights – of 11.14.1997), as I 3 . A.A. Cançado Trindade, "International Law for Humankind: Towards a New Jus Gentium - General Course on Public International Law", Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International de la Haye (2005) ch. XV (in press).