48. Taking the aforesaid into account, the Commission shall analyze next whether the interference in private life and distinction of treatment was carried out conventionally acceptable. In such aim, both the Commission and the Court have resorted to a gradual proportionality assessment which includes the following elements: i) the existence of a legitimate goal; ii) suitability, which means, determining whether there is a logic relation of causality form mean to goal between the distinction and the desired goal; (iii) the need, which is, determining whether there are less restrictive alternatives yet equally suitable; and (iv) proportionality in its strict sense, meaning, the balance of interests at stake and the degree of sacrifice of one in regard to the other49. 49. The Commission shall implement such test under rigorous scrutiny, as it fits for cases where distinctions of treatment are claimed based on sexual orientation. On this matter, the Commission recalls that as stated by the Inter American Court, when it comes to prohibition of discrimination for sexual orientation, the eventual restriction of a right demands rigorous fundament and fairly powerful, which implies that the reasons used to carry out a differentiation of treatment must be particularly serious and be supported on exhaustive argumentation. Also, the burden of proof is reverted, which means it is the authority’s duty to prove that its decision had no discriminatory purpose nor effect50. 50. Along the same lines, as for the legitimate goal for the interference or unequal treatment, as raised in the casefile, Supermercados Peruanos argued that the warning on the alleged victim was justified to ensure “the tranquility of its customers” since one of them “felt disturbed and uncomfortable by the conduct of the claimant ante the presence of his children”. The IACHR deems that guaranteeing “the tranquility of its customers” is not an imperative goal as it should correspond on a case of this nature in which it is indispensable to justify the limitation of a right with truly powerful reasons. 51. On the other hand, the Commission stresses that, in other similar cases after examining the suitability requirement, the Inter American Court has rejected generic allegations referred to the goal of guaranteeing the best interest of the child without proving why an unequal treatment based on sexual orientation contributes to such purpose. Specifically, in the case of Atala Riffo vs Chile, the Inter American Court underscored that: In conclusion, the Inter American Court observes that being, in abstract form, “the best interest of the child” a legitimate purpose, the sole reference to it without concretely proving the risks or damages that the sexual orientation of the mother could cause the girls, a suitable measure cannot be the restriction of a protected right such as being able to exercise all human rights with no discrimination whatsoever due to the sexual orientation of the person. The best interest of the child cannot be used to defend discrimination against the mother or the father for the sexual orientation of either one of them. This way, the judge shall not take this social condition into consideration as element to decide on a tuition or custody. (…) The Court considers that considerations based on stereotypes for sexual orientation are not admissible, which means, pre-conceptions of attributes, conducts or characteristics of homosexual persons or the impact these allegedly may have on girls and boys51. 52. Taking the above into consideration, the Commission deems that the invoked goal to ensure the tranquility of a customer who was with the presence of his children, who felt disturbed by the affectionate conduct of the alleged victim and his couple, it is not legitimate according to standards invoked previously. The Commission reiterates that the best interest of the child cannot be generically invoked without raising extremely weighty reasons, to limit expressions of affection found within basic norms of behavior and do not affect any juridically protected asset. IHR Court. Case of Artavia Murillo and others (“In vitro Fertilization”) vs. Costa Rica. Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Sentence November 28, 2012. Serie C No. 257, para 273; IHR Court. Case of Atala Riffo and girls vs. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Sentence of February 24, 2012. Serie C No. 239, para 146. 50 IHR Court. Case of Atala Riffo and girls vs. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Sentence of February 24, 2012. Serie C no. 239, para124; IHR Court. Caso Gonzales Lluy and others vs. Ecuador. Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Sentence of September 1, 2015. Serie C no. 298, para257. 51 IHR Court. Case of Atala Riffo and girls vs. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Sentence of February 24, 2012. Serie C no. 239, para111. 49 16