47 reputation of unnamed third parties is not an imperative social need” and “the imperative social interest was more important than the prejudices that could have justified a restriction to freedom of expression;” l) In this case, the means chosen to protect an alleged legitimate purpose was a disproportionate instrument restricting freedom of expression, because there were other less restrictive means by which Mr. Wasmosy, the only person directly named by Mr. Canese, could have defended his reputation, such as a rebuttal in the media or through a civil proceeding. By convicting Ricardo Canese for expressing his ideas, Paraguay violated the freedom of expression embodied in Article 13 of the Convention. This is true, whether the criminal conviction is considered an indirect restriction of freedom of expression, due to its intimidating nature, or a direct restriction, because it was unnecessary; m) The sentencing of Mr. Canese constitutes, per se, a violation of Article 13 of the Convention, whether or not the procedure that led to this constituted a violation of this Article; n) After the Commission’s application had been filed before the InterAmerican Court, the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay revoked the criminal conviction against Ricardo Canese, when deciding an appeal for review that he had filed; o) The State took an important step towards adapting its legislation to international standards for the protection of human rights, when it modified its penal legislation and criminal procedure at the end of the 1990s. However, the chapter on offenses against honor of the Penal Code of Paraguay continues to be used as an instrument to generate an “intimidating environment that inhibits statements on matters of public interest.” Article 151, paragraph 4, of the Paraguayan Penal Code, which establishes an exemption from liability, does not respond to the Commission’s recommendation, because: it is not applicable to all types of expression; its wording is not clear and incorporates a weighting between the obligation to investigate and the defense of public interest that does not clearly define the cases in which the exemption described will be applied; the truth test corresponds to the accused, and is only applied to offenses of slander and injuria, but not to libel. The weighting established in Article 151 of the Paraguayan Penal Code does not allow an open, robust and uninhibited debate in a democratic society;” p) According to the regulation of the offense of slander established in Article 151 of the Penal Code of Paraguay, the author’s affirmation must be false and the author must know that it is false. The impossibility of determining with certainty whether an affirmation is false could result in individuals who wish to emit an opinion being inhibited to do so. In practice, it is the accused who must prove why he believed what he said to be true; and this affects public debate; q) Article 151, paragraph 5, of the Penal Code of Paraguay establishes that the test of the truth of the affirmation or disclosure is only admitted in certain cases, which is characteristic of the legal doctrine known as exceptio