68 131. It must be considered whether the restriction to leave the country imposed on Mr. Canese was necessary to ensure that he did not evade the proceedings and his possible criminal liability. With regard to the elements that could have influenced the possibility of Mr. Canese absconding, the Court observes that: a) regarding the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sanction, Mr. Canese was convicted in second instance for the offense of slander to a sanction of two months’ imprisonment and a fine of two million nine hundred and nine thousand guaranis; b) it has been proved that the alleged victim offered a personal surety and a material surety and proof of his domicile in Paraguay; and c) even the President and Secretary General of the Bicameral Unlawful Acts Investigation Committee of the National Congress sent a communication to the judge in the case asking that, when deciding on one of Mr. Canese’s requests for authorization to leave the country, he should take into account that the Bicameral Commission considered it necessary that Mr. Canese accompany the Commission’s delegation that would travel to Brazil in June 1994 and indicated that Mr. Canese would return to Paraguay together with the Bicameral Commission’s delegation, “and that any suggestion that he wishes to abscond from the country in order to evade his trial should be rejected” (supra para. 69(55)). However, this permission was not granted by the judge in the case. Furthermore, the Court considers that, with time, this restriction became unnecessary because, during the almost eight years and four months when it was applied, Mr. Canese was granted permission to leave the country on repeated occasions as of May 1997, and he always returned to Paraguay and even submitted briefs to the judicial authorities informing them of his return (supra para. 69(62) to 69(65)), which shows that he would not have evaded his criminal liability should the sentence have been executed. Based on the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that the restriction to leave the country imposed on Mr. Canese during almost eight years and four months did not comply with the requirement of necessity in a democratic society, in violation of the provisions of Article 22(3) of the Convention. c) Requirement of proportionality in a democratic society 132. Regarding the requirement of proportionality in a democratic society, the Human Rights Committee stated in its General Comment No. 27 that: 14. […] Restrictive measures must conform to the principle of proportionality; they must be appropriate to achieve their protective function; they must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve the desired result; and they must be proportionate to the interest to be protected. 15. The principle of proportionality has to be respected not only in the law that frames the restrictions, but also by the administrative and judicial authorities in applying the law. States should ensure that any proceedings relating to the exercise or restriction of these rights are expeditious and that reasons for the application of restrictive measures are provided.141 133. The Court considers that the restriction of the right to leave the country imposed during criminal proceedings by means of a precautionary measure should be proportionate to the legitimate purpose sought, so that it is only applied when there is no other less restrictive measure and during the time that is strictly necessary to comply with its purpose: in this case, to avoid Mr. Canese absconding (supra para. 130). 141 U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27, supra note 135, paras. 14 and 15.