69 134. As has been demonstrated (supra paras. 120 to 122), and as indicated when examining the requirement of necessity (supra para. 130 and 131), Mr. Canese’s right to leave Paraguay freely was restricted for almost eight years and four months. According to the 1914 Penal Code, the maximum sanction that could have been imposed on Mr. Canese would have been 22 months’ imprisonment and a fine of up to two thousand pesos. If the sentence against Mr. Canese had been executed, which did not happen, because he filed several appeals and was absolved on December 11, 2002 (supra para. 69(49)), he would have had to serve a sentence of two months’ imprisonment. Regarding the sanction of payment of a fine, Mr. Canese offered personal surety and material surety and provided evidence of his domicile in Paraguay. The Court finds that the restriction of the right to leave the country imposed on Mr. Canese and the time during which it was applied were disproportionate to the objective sought, because there were other less onerous means that could guarantee compliance with the sanctions. In view of the foregoing considerations, the restriction of the right to leave the country freely that was imposed on Mr. Canese did not comply with the requirement of proportionality in a democratic society, which should characterize the precautionary measure, in violation of Article 22(3) of the American Convention. 135. On the foregoing grounds, the Court concludes that the State applied a restriction to Ricardo Canese’s right to leave the country without observing the requirements of legality, necessity and proportionality, necessary in a democratic society; thereby violating Article 22(2) and 22(3) of the American Convention. X VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 1(1) (RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL) Arguments of the Commission 136. Regarding Article 8 of the Convention, the Commission argued that: a) The proceedings against Ricardo Canese lasted almost ten years and, as a result of the judgment of first instance, his freedom of movement was restricted; b) The alleged victim was sentenced in first instance on March 22, 1994, and appealed this conviction; it was only three years after having filed the appeal that the judgment of second instance was delivered (November 4, 1997). Finally, on December 11, 2002, the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay revoked the criminal conviction when deciding an appeal for review filed on February 8, 1999, after the new Paraguayan Penal Code entered into force; c) It is necessary to consider whether the proceedings took place within a reasonable time. Regarding the complexity of the case, “the proceedings was particularly simple,” principally because there were few probative elements in the case file and they dated from the time the proceedings were initiated. The probative elements offered by the defense lawyer were rejected by the judge, considering that the presumption of exceptio veritatis had not been met. “The case cannot be considered complex, as it consisted essentially in the judge’s assessment of the content of the newspaper articles;”