75 143. When examining the criteria that should be taken into account to determine the reasonableness of the time during which the proceedings evolved (supra para. 141), the Court has verified that Mr. Canese was prosecuted and judged for the offenses of slander and injuria and that the principal probative elements were the two newspaper articles in which the statements against which legal action was taken were published, because no testimonial statements or expert reports were received. Furthermore, in his statement during the preliminary examination, Mr. Canese acknowledged that he had made the said statements, so that the probative material in the criminal proceedings was not very complex. In this respect, the State indicated that it agreed with the Commission that actions for slander and injuria “should not be considered complex, unless there is a great deal of evidence to be provided to the proceedings, and a large number of witnesses or victims, which did not occur in this case.” 144. Regarding the procedural activity of the parties, Mr. Canese filed several remedies in exercise of his rights under the domestic legal system and, it is established in the file that, on repeated occasions, both Mr. Canese and the complainants’ lawyer submitted briefs requesting the domestic courts to decide on the appeals that had been filed. 145. In the instant case, the conduct of the judicial authorities is closely related to the previous parameter for examining reasonable time. The State alleged that it should be borne in mind that the criminal proceedings to which Mr. Canese was subjected was regulated by a norm of an investigative type; that the criminal proceedings were of a private nature; in other words, “it would not have been appropriate for [the State] to expedite the proceedings de oficio”; and that, on several occasions, Mr. Canese’s representatives acted inadequately “by making timebarred submissions or through lack of procedural activity.” On several occasions, the judicial authorities even delayed decisions on the appeals that the complainants were requesting insistently. For example, after the Third Chamber of the Court of Criminal Appeal had granted the remedy of appeal filed by the complainants’ lawyer against the judgment of second instance on November 19, 1997, and ordered that the case files should be forwarded to the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay, the complainants’ lawyer was obliged to request that this appeal be decided. Despite this, the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay took approximately three years and five months to rule on the appeal. 146. In the criminal proceedings filed against Mr. Canese, the judicial authorities did not act with due diligence and promptness; this is reflected, for example, by: a) the proceedings lasted eight years and six months until the judgment of second instance was final; b) the time that elapsed between the filing of the appeal against the judgment of first instance and the delivery of the judgment of second instance was three years and seven months; and c) the time that elapsed between the filing of the remedy of appeal against the judgment of second instance filed by the complainants’ lawyer and the final decision was approximately three years and five months. 147. The Court observes that the State itself affirmed that it is possible that “…[Mr.] Canese’s case –regulated by the old procedure– was one of those delayed beyond the minimum parameters established in the American Convention; although it is not possible to attribute this to the bodies of the Paraguayan State, which, in the