57 46). They represent their electorate, draw attention to their preoccupations and defend their interests. Accordingly, interferences with the freedom of expression of a politician who is a member of an opposition party, like the applicant, call for the closest scrutiny on the Court’s part.125 90. The Court considers it essential that the exercise of freedom of expression should be protected and guaranteed in the political debate that precedes the election of State authorities who will govern a State. The formation of the collective will through the exercise of individual suffrage is nourished by the different options presented by the political parties through the candidates that represent them. Democratic debate implies that the free circulation of ideas and information on the candidates and their political parties is permitted through the media, the candidates themselves, and any individual who wishes to express his opinion and provide information. Everyone must be allowed to question and investigate the competence and suitability of the candidates, and also to disagree with and compare proposals, ideas and opinions, so that the electorate may form its opinion in order to vote. In this respect, the exercise of political rights and freedom of thought and expression are closely related and reinforce one another. Hence, the European Court has established that: Free elections and freedom of expression, particularly freedom of political debate, together form the bedrock of any democratic system (see the Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 113, p. 22, § 47, and the Lingens v. Austria judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103, p. 26, §§ 41–42). The two rights are inter-related and operate to reinforce each other: for example, as the Court has observed in the past, freedom of expression is one of the “conditions” necessary to “ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature” (see the above-mentioned Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt judgment, p. 24, § 54). For this reason, it is particularly important in the period preceding an election that opinions and information of all kinds are permitted to circulate freely.126 91. The Court observes that, in his statements, the alleged victim referred to CONEMPA, whose President was Juan Carlos Wasmosy, at that time a presidential candidate, “passing” dividends to former dictator Stroessner. It has been proved, and it is also a public fact, that this consortium was one of the two companies contracted to execute the construction work of the Itaipú hydroelectric power plant, one of the larges hydroelectric dams in the world and Paraguay’s principal public works project. 92. The Court considers that there is no doubt that the statements made by Mr. Canese with regard to CONEMPA concern matters of public interest, because, when he made them, this company was involved in the construction of the said hydroelectric power plant. According to the body of evidence in the instant case (supra para. 69(4)), the National Congress itself, through its Bicameral Unlawful Acts Investigation Committee, was investigating corruption at Itaipú, involving Juan Carlos Wasmosy and the said company. 93. The Court observes that, when issuing the decision annulling the sentences handed down in 1994 and 1997 (supra para. 69(49)), the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay indicated that the statements made by Mr. Canese in the political context of the electoral campaign for the presidency of the 125 126 Eur. Court H.R., Case of Incal v. Turkey, judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports 1998-IV, para. 46. Eur. Court H.R., Case of Bowman v. The United Kingdom, judgment of 19 February 1998, Reports 1998-I, para. 42.