61 imperative social interest that justified the punitive measure, because the freedom of thought and expression of the alleged victim was restricted disproportionately, without taking into consideration that his statements referred to matters of public interest. In a democratic society, the foregoing constitutes an excessive restriction or limitation of the right to freedom of thought and expression of Ricardo Canese, incompatible with Article 13 of the American Convention. 107. Furthermore, the Court considers that, in this case, the criminal proceeding, the consequent sentence imposed on Mr. Canese for more than eight years, and the restrictions to leave the country during almost eight years and four months constituted indirect means of restricting his freedom of thought and expression. In this respect, after his criminal conviction, Mr. Canese was dismissed from the newspaper where he worked and, for some time, did not publish his articles in any other newspaper. 108. In view of the above, the Court considers that the State violated the right to freedom of thought and expression embodied in Article 13 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of Ricardo Canese, given that the restrictions to the exercise of this right imposed on him during approximately eight years exceed the framework established in the said Article. 109. The Court will not rule on the claims of the representatives of the alleged victim regarding the alleged violation of Article 2 of the Convention, given that the facts of this case do not fall within its provisions. IX VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 22 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 1(1) (FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND RESIDENCE) Arguments of the Commission 110. Regarding Article 22 of the Convention, the Commission indicated that: a) Mr. Canese was submitted to a permanent restriction to leave the country and the Paraguayan judges lifted this restriction only in “exceptional circumstances and very irregularly;” b) In June 1994, Ricardo Canese filed an action on unconstitutionality before the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay against the restriction to leave the country imposed on him. However, these proceedings “were conducted with evident negligence” by the Paraguayan authorities, and it was only in May 1999 that the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay declared that the action on unconstitutionality was inadmissible, “without having considered [it] thoroughly;” c) Measures that restrict freedom of movement in a democratic society must be essential, adapted to the principle of proportionality, and compatible with other rights; d) According to the Code of Criminal Procedure in force when the judgment convicting Mr. Canese was handed down, the surety for the costs of a lawsuit was the only kind of surety required of the defendant who requested authorization to absent himself from his domicile, and assets deposited with