30. This is precisely what happened in the instant case, in which the representative of the victims and their next of kin has submitted her own understanding of the origin of the responsibility of the State, different from that of the Inter-American Commission. Regarding this matter, we must take into account general international law, alongside and together with the American Convention. We must not forget that, of all the methods used in the international human rights protection systems, the only one that is activated by the individuals themselves (rather than activated ex officio by the bodies entrusted with their oversight) is the right to individual petition. It is by exercising this right that individuals, emancipated from their own State, are able to set in motion the process of implementing the international responsibility of the State. 31. To try to impede the jus standi of individuals before the international venue in the current sphere of protection is an unconvincing artifice, hostage to past dogma, incapable of understanding that assertion of the international juridical capacity and right to legal recognition of the human person reflects a real necessity of the international juridical order itself.29 As I noted in my Concurring Opinion in the aforementioned case of the “Five Pensioners”, if “before national tribunals the faculty of the individual complainants to substantiate their own allegations of violations of their rights is secured, how to justify the denial or restriction of that faculty to the individual petitioners before the international tribunals of human rights?” (para 23). And I concluded: “In fact, the assertion of those juridical personality and capacity constitutes the truly revolutionary legacy of the evolution of the international legal doctrine in the second half of the 20th century. (...) An important role is here being exercised by the impact of the proclamation of human rights in the international legal order, in the sense of humanizing the latter: those rights were proclaimed as inherent to every human being, irrespectively of any circumstances.30 The individual is subject jure suo of International Law, and to the recognition of the rights that are inherent to him corresponds ineluctably the procedural capacity to vindicate them, at national as well as international levels.” (para. 24). 32. By exercising this procedural capacity, the individual today activates the mechanism for implementation of the international responsibility of the State for human rights violations. The individual petitioner today is able, as shown en the instant case of the Gómez Paquiyauri brothers, of –correctly- stating his or her understanding of the origin of State responsibility, for its subsequent international implementation. The instant adjudicatory proceeding has clearly demonstrated that full participation of the individuals –the victim or the victim’s next of kin and their legal representatives- in said proceeding before the Court contributes effectively to better conduct the proceeding,31 both regarding factual and legal aspects.32 29 . A.A. Cançado Trindade, "A Personalidade e Capacidade Jurídicas do Indivíduo como Sujeito do Direito Internacional", in Jornadas de Derecho Internacional (Mexico City, December 2001), Washington D.C., OAS Subsecretariat of Legal Affairs, 2002, pp. 311-347. 30 . I-A Ct of HR, Advisory Opinion OC-17/02, on the Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, of 28.08.2002, operative paragraph n. 1, and Concurring Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, paras. 171. 31 . In addition to ensuring their right to freedom of expression in the course of the international proceeding. 32 . See, in this regard, A.A. Cançado Trindade, "Vers la consolidation de la capacité juridique internationale des pétitionnaires dans le système interaméricain des droits de la personne", 14 Revue québécoise de droit international (2001) pp. 207-239, esp. pp. 223-224; and see A.A. Cançado Trindade, "Le système inter-américain de protection des droits de l'homme: état actuel et perspectives d'évolution à l'aube du XXIème siècle", 46 Annuaire français de Droit international - Paris (2000) pp. 570-577.