2 killing and injuries have stopped altogether. No other information matters as much, since that news would go directly to the issue of most concern to the Inter-American Court and that dictated the need for provisional measures and the reason why they were ordered. It is all well and good that there should be prison reform, that new prison laws should be enacted, that inmates should be classified, prison facilities modernized, prison guards and corrections officers recruited carefully, suitable alternatives to a sentence of imprisonment found, visiting under decent conditions permitted, medical services provided to safeguard the inmates’ health, and schools, workshops and work units created. All this, and even more, is absolutely essential, because it reflects modern standards on the subject of deprivation of liberty, either for preventive purposes or by sentence, a measure called into serious question at the present time. But none of that, which has to be done as soon as possible, can substitute for the immediate adoption of the measures necessary to prevent even one more death at Urso Branco Prison. I said as much at the conclusion of the hearing in question, and I say so again in this Concurring Opinion, which I announced at the conclusion of that session. That immediate and concrete result is precisely what the Court had in mind when it issued this Order for provisional measures, the latest in a series adopted over the past two years. Obviously, while other reforms or advances may be a question of gradually achieving certain goals, what is required here is immediate action, using every legitimate means to the fullest extent to preserve the life of each and every inmate at Urso Branco -and the lives of the other people whose lives and safety are at risk- regardless of their juridical situation. The Court’s Order is premised upon the State’s specific obligations when it comes to persons deprived of liberty and in the State’s exclusive custody. As the Court has held in various orders, the State must serve as guarantor of the rights of those it has in its custody. These people are entirely subject to the State’s immediate authority and to the active or negligent conduct of its agents. They have no real capacity to provide for their own safety and defense and, because of that, too frequently find themselves up against devastating circumstances. As guarantor, the State is entirely and exclusively responsible for preserving their rights. The peculiar helplessness of the inmates creates special obligations that must be fulfilled promptly, as their welfare and even their very lives depend upon it. This is what happens in adult prisons, juvenile detention centers, institutions for the mentally ill and other institutions in which, in one way or another and under various labels, liberty is deprived and the persons in them are under the complete control of the public authorities. It is self-evident that the State has, vis-à-vis all persons subject to its jurisdiction, a duty to recognize, respect, protect and guarantee the human being’s fundamental rights. This obligation of the State takes on added emphasis when the individuals are completely and directly dependent on and subordinate to the State’s agents, as is clearly the case in the hypothetical situations to which I made reference and in which there is a legal and material relationship between the authority and the private person that does not exist in most cases, at least not with the same characteristics. Hence, the State’s role as guarantor of rights is heightened, as is its responsibility vis-à-vis those within its custody. For this very reason, one could say that the State has an “aggravated” responsibility vis-à-vis such persons. Elsewhere I have alluded to this heightened responsibility and the consequent reparations owed by virtue of