the punitive decision stated that the aggravating factors contained in Article 30 (c), (d), and (m) of the Disciplinary Regulations of the National Police were also present. Specifically, paragraphs (d) and (m) refer to “repeated commission of offenses in terms of time and seriousness” and “any other circumstance that in the opinion of the superior increases the seriousness of the offense or suggests that the punished individual may be presumed dangerous.” 91. It is to be surmised from the foregoing that in imposing punishment on the alleged victim, the Disciplinary Tribunal took into account his criminal prosecution for homicide, which was ultimately dismissed by the Superior Court of Babahoyo. It also took into account two discharges with which the alleged victim was punished in 1996 and 1998, which were reversed by the Constitutional Court when it found that the alleged victim's procedural guarantees were violated in those proceedings. That means, that the mere fact of having undergone disciplinary or criminal proceedings—notwithstanding that they did not culminate in punishment—was a factor introduced in the disciplinary proceeding with which this case is concerned and considered by the Disciplinary Tribunal as evidence of recidivism and, therefore, an aggravating circumstance. The foregoing violates the principle of presumption of innocence. 92. Based on the foregoing, the Commission concludes that the Ecuadorian State violated Article 8(2) of the American Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of Víctor Henry Mina Cuero. 3. The principle of legality46 and the right to sufficient justification of decisions 93. The principle of legality contained in Article 9 of the American Convention governs the actions of State organs in the exercise of their punitive power. 47 As mentioned above, that principle applies to disciplinary processes, which are “an expression of the punitive powers of the State” given that they entail an impairment or alteration of the rights of individuals as a consequence of illicit conduct.48 94. In particular, the law must give detailed guidance on the infractions by judges that trigger disciplinary measures, including the gravity of the infraction which determines the kind of disciplinary measure to be applied in the case at hand. In that regard, in Maestri v. Italy, the European Court wrote that the principle of legality requires not only that the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law, but also refer to the quality of the law in question. The law should be accessible to the persons concerned and formulated with sufficient precision to enable them—if need be, with appropriate advice—to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. 95. In the Case of López Lone, the Inter-American Court stated that “it is impossible to codify all assumptions” in disciplinary matters, so that “ultimately, there must always be a relatively open clause concerning professional duties. However, in these assumptions and when open or indeterminate disciplinary offenses are used, it is fundamental to provide a statement of reasons when applying them, because it is incumbent on the disciplinary court to interpret these norms respecting the principle of legality and observing the greatest rigor when verifying the existence of punishable conduct.”49 46 Article 9 of the American provides: “No one shall be convicted of any act or omission that did not constitute a criminal offense, under the applicable law, at the time it was committed.” A heavier penalty shall not be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offense was committed. If subsequent to the commission of the offense the law provides for the imposition of a lighter punishment, the guilty person shall benefit therefrom. 47 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/Doc.49/15, December 31, 2015, par. 253. 48I/A Court H.R., Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of October 5, 2015, Series C No. 302, par. 257, and Case of Maldonado Ordoñez v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of May 3, 2016. Series C No. 311, par. 89. I/A Court H.R. Baena Ricardo et al. Case v. Panama, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of February 2, 2001. Series C No. 72, pars. 106 and 108. 49I/A Court H.R., Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of October 5, 2015, Series C No. 302, par. 271. Mutatis, mutandis, also relevant is what the Inter-American Court found in the case of Mohamed: “being an offense of negligence, whose criminal definition is open and must be completed by the judge upon analyzing the legal definition of the crime, what is important is that the judgment identify the corresponding duty of care infringed by the defendant’s active behavior (imprudence) or omission (negligence).” See I/A Court H.R., Case of Mohamed v. Argentina, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of November 24, 2012, Series C No. 255, par. 136.