44. In the specific case of house raids – particularly during the night, which are only permitted exceptionally – the principle of proportionality requires that the magistrate or judge must justify the need for the measure and specify when it should take place 85 and, in the cases of strict necessity mentioned above, that it should be conducted during night hours. 86 In addition, the official must expressly substantiate why it is not possible to conduct the raid during daytime hours. Among the criteria that should support this analysis, we underscore, without prejudice to other considerations, those listed by the European Court of Human Rights in its judgment in Buck v. Germany (2005): “the severity of the offence in relation to the police operation; the manner and circumstances in which the order was issued; the content and scope of the order, having particular regard to the nature of the premises searched and the safeguards taken.” 87 It should also be taken into account that, in the case of nighttime raids, specific justification must be provided for the necessity for the police to enter the homes in the early morning hours while the residents are in bed. 88 Also, other important factors should be assessed, such as the presence of children and women in the home. As the International Committee of the Red Cross has indicated in its International Rules and Standards for Policing, it is important “that planned police operations are prepared carefully and with all possible precautions being taken to protect uninvolved people, and also the person to be arrested.” 89 45. It is important to consider, however, that the weighing between the interests of the State and the rights of the citizen should only occur if and after previous adequate steps have been taken to verify the justification of the restriction of the fundamental right. The weighing is not a substitute for either the decision on suitability and necessity or, above all, the principle of legal reserve or legality. When the judge authorizes a specific intervention (as in the case of the judicial authorization of a nighttime raid), it is not incumbent on him to weigh, freely and directly, the interests of the criminal prosecution and the individual rights; rather, his decision is related to the principles of legality and proportionality in the broad sense. In other words, when applying the law that authorizes an intervention in a fundamental right, the judge must make a strict subsumption of the factual substratum of the law. Over and above the semantic contours of the authorizing law and without the decisions on suitability and necessity, any consideration is proscribed. 90 46. Therefore, it should be indicated that the reserve of jurisdiction does not substitute or supplant the legal reserve, and especially the principle of proportionality; rather it defines them and supplements them, as the ECHR has indicated: “the fact that a search is based on a warrant issued by a judge does not necessarily amount to a sufficient safeguard. It also matters whether that prior judicial scrutiny was properly carried out (…): whether the judge duly examined the existence of a reasonable suspicion justifying the search.” 91 47. In summary, it is fair to say that the case examined reveals the importance of conceiving coercive measures in criminal proceedings as restrictions of the fundamental rights that require justification, from both the formal point of view, by an authorizing law 85 Cf. CABEZUDO BAJO, op. cit., p. 215. 86 As expressly required by German legal doctrine, cf. with further references PARK, cit., § 2 No. 197. 87 Cf. ECHR, Buck v. Germany, n. 41604/98, Judgment of April 28, 2005, §45. 88 Cf. ECHR, Keegan v. The United Kingdom, n. 28867/03, Judgment of July 18, 2006, §33. Cf. ICRC. International Rules and Standards for Policing https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0809.pdf p. 40. 89 (2016). Available at: 90 See SCHAUER, Frederik. Balancing, Subsumption, and the Constraining Role of Legal Text, Law & Ethics of Human Rights, vol. 4, 2010, pp. 35 ff., 40, 44, who states: “the typical subsumption inquiry is largely constrained, largely textually interpretive, and largely characterized by the way in which the constraints of a moderately clear text, when one exists, exclude numerous factors and considerations that would not only otherwise be relevant, but would also, typically, be relevant were the methodology to be one of balancing or proportionality rather than subsumption.” 91 ECHR, Posevini v. Bulgaria, n. 63638/14, Judgment of January 19, 2017, §70. 12