urgency to enter the home of another, duly justified and protected by reasons de facto and de iure, in order to avoid the smooth flow of the proceedings and the lawfulness of the evidence eventually obtained being compromised, and also undue restrictions of the right. 52. Consequently, it is necessary to go further proposing an interpretation that guarantees the inviolability of the home and that, at the same time, establishes clear parameters that guide the actions of law enforcement agents in exceptional situations. To this end, Article 11(2) of the Convention should be used as an interpretation standard. This article establishes the protection of the home from “arbitrary or abusive interference.” 53. This reveals that a criterion that must obligatorily be observed in the case of the exception derived from flagrante delicto is the de facto existence of a prior justification under the law that permits the raiding of a home. This means that the verification of in flagrante delicto should precede the entry into the home and cannot be justified subsequently. To the contrary, it would be an arbitrary measure prohibited by the Convention. 54. Despite the possibility of prescinding with the judicial control prior to the entry into someone’s home in this situation, allowing it to take place without a warrant, a rigorous analysis a posteriori is required by the respective magistrate or judge to verify whether or not the individual guarantees were violated during the raid specifically examined, 92 as the Federal Supreme Court of Brazil, for example, has already decided. Subsequent judicial control is extremely important to examine the reasons that justified the house raid and whether elements truly existed that indicated the presence of flagrante delicto; in other words, whether the analysis of proportionality made by the law enforcement agents was coherent and whether minimum grounds existed for the adoption of the measures that restricted rights. 55. More specifically, in relation to the limits to the analysis made by the judge, we can mention that, for example, unlawful evidence, anonymous complaints, and statements made by unidentified “informers” cannot be used to undermine the inviolability of the home, especially during the nighttime, so that the police can raid it in an alleged situation of flagrante delicto. In such cases, the evidence eventually obtained should be considered unacceptable, owing to its evident unlawfulness, without prejudice to the possible liability of the law enforcement agents who took part in the unlawful operation. 56. This issue should be highlighted in light of crimes of an ongoing nature, where flagrante delicto extends over time – and in which the understanding adopted regarding the possibility of a violation of the home without a warrant should be limited to scenarios in which there is sufficient evidence that a crime has probably been committed; that is, substantial grounds for the entry into the home to be considered regular and lawful. Only in those circumstances in which the factual situation before the raid allows it to be concluded that, beyond any reasonable doubt, criminal acts are being committed in the home, is it possible to speak of the plausibility and lawfulness of the raid. 57. In such cases of ongoing offenses, it is usual that house raids occur merely when information exists (often from an unidentified informer or an anonymous report) that a specific offense is being committed. Evidently, based on the previous considerations, this information is not sufficient to suggest the situation of flagrante delicto necessary for 92 In this regard, the Federal Supreme Court of Brazil has recently decided, in light of Article 11(2) of the American Convention and Article 17(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that the absence of judicial control before or after home raids, even in situation of flagrante delicto, removed “the fundamental core of the guarantee of the inviolability of the home (…) and would cease to protect against arbitrary interference in the home.” Federal Supreme Court, Special Appeal No. 603.615/RO. Judgment of November 5, 2015. 14