conducting a house raid, owing to either the source of the information or its content, if no evidence exists regarding the alleged conduct that gives rise to a well-founded suspicion. 58. Another issue that should be evaluated is the possible exception to the prohibition of house raids in the event of the “consent of the resident,” which is included in some domestic laws. This situation merits greater attention because it evidently ignores the unequal relationship between the citizen and the public agent, especially in this situation in which the agent seeks to take a measures to restrict the guarantee of the inviolability of the home. 59. The lack of confidence in the consent of the resident is mentioned by the Supreme Court of the United States in Amos v. United States (1921), 93 in which it was held that the consent to enter a home without a warrant was not a waiver of the constitutional privilege against unreasonable search and seizure. In another decision, the Supreme Court established that the consent of the resident “must be unequivocal, specific and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion” (United States v McCaleb 94). 60. In the absence of a reasonable suspicion that the situation constitutes flagrante delicto, such consent should not be considered arbitrarily to allow the house raid owing to the fact that the citizen, within this unequal relationship with the public agent who possesses authority and power, has permitted the agent to enter his home. It is worth emphasizing that a raid without a warrant is only possible when there has been prior substantiated verification that a crime is being committed, with specific and objective evidence that, together with an analysis of proportionality, permits the action. 61. This requirement cannot be excluded alleging the consent of the residents. The fact is that the said consent, to be legally valid, must be voluntary and free of coercion. It is evident, therefore, that, for the resident to allow entry into his home, no coercion by the police authority is allowed. 62. Although the possibility of expressly establishing this exception is not denied, even with the safeguards described, consent, as in the case of flagrante delicto, also requires subsequent careful judicial analysis. In this case, the judge must first verify the evidence that the law enforcement agents had in order to be able to adopt this measure and then, what evidence there is that the resident consented to the entry, freely and spontaneously. In case of doubt, for example, if the versions of the agents and that of the resident differ, the version should prevail of the person whose right was violated: the citizen. This is because the State has the burden of proving that consent was truly free and voluntary. To guarantee the lawfulness of the measure, the French Code of Criminal Procedure requires express consent in a written statement by the interested party, as follows: Article 76: Searches, home visits and the seizure of incriminating evidence or items whose confiscation is established in article 131-2 of the Criminal Code may not be carried out without the express consent of the person in whose home the operation takes place. This consent shall be recorded in a handwritten statement by the interested party or, if he or she cannot write, it shall be noted in the record, as well as his or her consent. 95 63. Nevertheless, even if an express declaration of consent exists, the State must prove that this was given freely, and that there are no indications that it was obtained by coercion. This requirement is fundamental to avoid arbitrariness and abuse of authority when conducting a house raid. 93 Cf. Supreme Court of the United States. Amos v. US, 255 US 313 (1921), judgment of February 28, 2021. 94 US Court of Appeals. Sixth Circuit. US v. McCaleb. 552 f.2d 717 (1977), judgment of April 11, 1977. 95 French Code of Criminal Procedure, article 76. 15