11 paramilitary activity been considered. It maintains that the phenomenon of paramilitary activity in Colombia is surrounded by various elements of, inter alia, a political, sociological, economic and cultural character - typical to each geographic region and period in time. The State objects to the allegations on the responsibility for paramilitary activity as an irregular counter-insurgency policy or institutional strategy and rejects in limine all those allegations directly referring to paramilitary activity and to the existence of an institutional policy of that nature. 55. In addition, in relation to the consideration of evidence originating from the alleged victims, the State argues that the Inter-American Court has stressed that when "the alleged victims have a direct interest in the case, their statements shall not be assessed separately but as a whole with the 15 rest of the body of evidence of the proceeding" . In this regard, it expresses concern at the lack of procedural consequences for the party indulging in this type of conduct in individual petition proceedings, which compromises the effective guarantee of human rights. It maintains that the "statements" of Mr. Bernardo Vivas were not given before the Colombian judicial authorities, and so the State did not have the opportunity of weighing them and incorporating them within the investigations or proceedings underway for the events. It considers that this ignores the principle of subsidiarity of the procedure before the Commission. The State also alleges that Bernardo Vivas' statement is not sufficient evidence to prove the events related, and must be corroborated by other evidentiary means, since the said Bernardo Vivas has acknowledged that he is one of the alleged victims in the present case. 56. The State alleges that the petitioners offer as evidence documents of a private nature, which were filed before the national judicial authorities and that cannot stand as evidence, to the extent that they include submissions made in domestic proceedings already decided upon by the competent authorities. The State considers that the constancias (public statements made by the petitioners) cannot be held as evidence either due to the lack of proof of their having been received by the authorities; or failing this, the Commission would be acting as a forth instance court. 57. The State reiterates that Mr. Bernardo Vivas Mosquera's statement, taken by the IACHR in the context of the in loco visit conduced in Colombia in 2001, is absent from the case file in the present case, and that the petitioners sent a sworn affidavit from Bernardo Vivas on April 3, 2009, with extraprocedural aims, which refers to the alleged events. The State considers that the reference to alleged evidence which has not been sent for the State's response or that - as has occurred in the present matter - is absent from the case file, constitutes an act of procedural disloyalty and a lack of truth on the Commission's and alleged victims' part, because it is through the evidence that the Commission may reach conclusions as to the truth of the events. 58. With regard to Marino López's death, the State maintains that the troops' situation reports and the itinerary of "Operation Genesis" demonstrate that Brigade XVII was not deployed in the Bijao area. It alleges that in accordance with the investigation's hypothesis, the killing of Marino López was perpetrated by members of the self-defense forces, and thus there is no international responsibility for the alleged violation of the right to life. It also alleges that there is no evidence of racially motivated acts against the victim and that therefore no violation of the right to equality before the law against Marino López has been demonstrated. 59. With regard to the alleged violations of the physical and moral integrity of Marino López's immediate family, the State maintains that the alleged violation of Article 5 of the ACHR presupposes the existence of responsibility for the alleged violations, and that given that the State's responsibility for the violation of the right to life of Marino López has not been established, this presumption would not necessarily follow. They also maintain that Marino López's direct family members have not been individually identified. 15 In support of its argument the State cites: I/A Court H.R. Case of Kawas Fernández. Judgment of April 3, 2009, Series C, No. 198. para. 40; Case of Loayza Tamayo. Judgment of September 17, 1997, Series C No. 33, para. 43; Case of Ríos et al.. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Series C, No. 194, para. 89, and Case of Perozo et al. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Series C, No. 195, para. 103. Note of the Foreign Ministry, August 27, 2009.