27 he told Mr. Méndez García that he knew where the attack came from, but that it was “better” not to investigate it. The UCN members of Congress summoned him to explain the case. Consequently, members of the President’s staff entered the premises of the Attorney General’s office in order to question him; the witness did not permit this. As of that time, he was subjected to “similar acts and to being followed constantly.” During the proceeding, there was a pseudo line of investigation, which was partially true, in which a band of civilian self-defense patrolmen (PAC) were accused. Mr. Méndez García, who was carrying out his functions independently, was able to rectify the investigation by establishing that it had been manipulated. The line taken by the investigation pointed towards the perpetrators, and clues were beginning to appear that could have led to the masterminds. These clues led to “well-known people” related to the Army, who had been involved in the preparation, guarding and cleaning-up of the crime scene. Obstacles were put in the way of the witness’s work as prosecutor; he had no logistic support, because, at the start, he had only been assigned two officials with minimum technical capacity to assist him. These officials were afraid and one of them warned him that he could n ot continue with the proceeding because the work they were doing was dangerous. Subsequently, he was had to continue alone. The Prosecutor General began to assume an attitude that was incongruous with his position: he began to withdraw support from Mr. Méndez García, who did not have an office, or officials to assist him, and was told that he should defer to the Prosecutor General’s office. Mr. Méndez García started ordering the Minister of Defense and other relevant entities to forward him any documentation they considered would allow him to learn more about the case. However, this attitude alarmed those who did not want the case to be investigated. In September 1995, the Intelligence Commission of the United States Senate invited him to explain the case; but the Prosecutor General opposed this and issued an order disallowing it; despite this, Mr. Méndez García attended this meeting. When the witness had established the connection leading to the intellectual authorship of these events, an overt psychological war was waged against him, which affected his health. Despite this, he did not leave the case at that time. Nevertheless, when he had assembled and submitted the probative evidence, he withdrew from the case and went into exile on November 7, 1996, with his family. During his time in exile, Mr. Méndez García only received help as a refugee; in other words, he was unable to work and was under surveillance. The income he received during his time in exile could not compare with his status as a professional. He indicated that being a refugee involved humiliation, ignorance, alienation and “obliteration of awareness.” Mr. Méndez García, his four children and his wife, were in exile for nearly a year. Guatemala requires a guaranteed democratic State. The justice sector needs “a profound re-oxygenation and re-engineering,” because neither the