9 in two ways: “on the one hand, the State cannot seek to try a person for the same criminal offenses by means of a challenge brought by the accuser to vacate a judgment of acquittal; on the other hand, the principle has to be interpreted in the formal sense of the effects of a final verdict of acquittal.” Petitioner Pascual Pichún submitted to the Commission arguments similar to those made by petitioner Aniceto Norín to the effect that the decision of the Supreme Court to vacate his verdict of acquittal and order a new trial, was a violation of his rights to be presumed innocent and of the double jeopardy rule 26 recognized in articles 8(2) and 8(4) of the American Convention. Petitioner Pascual Pichún also contends that the principle of non bis in idem recognized in Article 8 of the American Convention was violated; he used the same reasoning that petitioner Aniceto Norín used, which was that his verdict of 27 acquittal was challenged by the accusing party. The State 27. Regarding the violation of the principle of non bis in idem alleged by Pascual Pichún and Aniceto Norín by virtue of the fact that the original verdict of acquittal and the trial that preceded it were vacated, the State contends that no such violation occurred because the verdict of acquittal was not final under the applicable domestic law, since the State still had the right to challenge the decision by a motion seeking to have the decision vacated. For the State, “…the alleged violation of the principle of non bis in idem did not happen. The double jeopardy rule previously cited expressly provides that the rule prohibiting retrial for the same facts applies in the case of a final verdict of conviction or acquittal of someone whom the State now seeks to retry for the same facts; a sentence is final “under the law and criminal procedure of each country.’ // Under Chilean procedural law, and as prescribed in Article 174 of the Code of Civil Procedure (a provision that also applies in criminal matters), a decision shall be considered final or executed once the parties have been so notified, provided no remedy can be filed to challenge it; therefore, if there is some remedy that the parties can use to challenge a court ruling, said court ruling cannot be considered final, provided the deadline for filing the challenge has not passed. In the instant case, the verdict of acquittal handed down by the Angol Oral Criminal Trial Court could be challenged by a motion to have the verdict vacated. That motion (…) is regulated under articles 372 et seq of the Chilean Procedural Code; a party has ten days in which to file such a challenge, counted from the date of notification of the respective ruling. Thus, one cannot claim that the principle in question has been violated if Chilean law already had on the books a remedy intended to challenge a court ruling; in this case, the ruling was filed within the statutory period and therefore the sentence was neither final nor 28 executed.” E. The right to be heard by a competent, impartial and independent judge or tribunal. The petitioners Arguments pertaining to the violation of the right to a competent judge 28. Petitioner Aniceto Norín has challenged the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to nullify his verdict of acquittal on the grounds that in nullifying the verdict, the Supreme Court did not speak to the grounds upon which it has competence to vacate a verdict; instead, it cited grounds that are the jurisdiction of the appellate courts. The petitioner explains that (i) under Chilean law, the general rule is that motions seeking to have a verdict vacated are to be heard by the respective appellate courts and 26 Here he writes that “the Chilean justice system (…) is now forcing me to be retried for the very same facts since, in the opinion of the highest court, my innocence was not duly established. In other words, based a violation of the principle of presumption of innocence, the court ordered a violation of my right to the principle of non bis in idem. (…) Summarizing, in my case, the court ordered that a criminal case against me be retried on the grounds that my innocence had not been duly established, thus concurrently violating my right to presumption of innocence and my right not to be retried for the same cause. My petition seeks a stop to the criminal persecution of me.” Original petition that Pascual Pichún Paillalao filed with the IACHR, received on August 15, 2003, p. 5. 27 Observations of Aniceto Norín and Pascual Pichún on the merits of the matter before the IACHR, received on March 1, 2007, p. 31. 28 Response from the Chilean State to Petition P-619-03, received by the IACHR on November 30, 2004, p. 6.