5 16. The determination on the nature of the substance whose possession was attributed to the defendant is the center of the criminal persecution, pursuant to the definition used for the incrimination and development of the process, which would support, at its time, a conviction. Therefore, the greatest evidentiary weight must be directed toward that matter as of the first moment. And, the State must justify, every step of the way, the legitimacy of its criminal intervention, it must have elements of judgment that are enough and constant for that purpose and always be alert to the possible disappearance of that information, which would determine the cessation of the procedure. It is notorious that this did not occur in this case, since there was a situation of serious doubt –much greater than the uncertainty that could be natural in the course of the trial, destined to be dispelled—and that the authority that should have confronted it and solved it did not do so in an immediate and sufficient manner. 17. Even when the arrest is based on a good apparent motive, as can be observed from the facts in which it occurs, and even when the process is started, this is not so when the deprivation of liberty continues even after the apparently good motive has ceased and such circumstance is apparent to the authority called upon to issue a final judgment. It is essential that there be a jurisdictional means that can operate so that a situation that is not well founded, and therefore lacks legitimacy, may be ceased. Nothing justifies the prolongation of a detention, as well as the process itself, when the information that supports one and the other at the light of the criminal definition ceases to exist. With this the presumption of innocence and even the legality of the trial itself look bad. Of course, the International Court can not substitute the domestic court in the assessment of the evidence, but it can not be indifferent before the absolute and prolonged lack of enough evidence and the absence of a timely assessment of the facts, whose circumstances were acknowledged by the domestic jurisdiction itself. IV. PREVENTIVE DETENTION 18. Once more we are faced with the problem of the preventive detention, that is, of the most severe of the precautionary measures still used in criminal trials, since it implies a profound restriction to freedom, with very important consequences. We normally state that the preventive detention is not a real sanction; it is not a punitive measure, but instead simply a precautionary and ephemeral one. Technically, this is true. However, considering this phenomena in the light of reality –even when it comes up against the technicality—preventive detention does not differ at all, except in its name, of the punitive detention: both are a deprivation of freedom, they (normally) occur in terrible conditions, they cause the subject and those that surround him a serious material and mental damage, and they normally have long-term repercussions, sometimes devastating. In fact, on not little occasions –the Case of López Álvarez is a sample of it, certainly not the only one – the preventive detention prolongs for the same period of time or even longer than a punitive detention. Therefore, among other things, it is necessary to seriously weigh in the justification, the characteristics, duration, and alternatives of the preventive detention. 19. In my concept –deeply-rooted in a tradition of highly unfavorable opinions, or in any case, strongly critical of the preventive detention – the cautionary deprivation of freedom --“deprive of freedom in order to find out if liberty can be deprived”—must be reduced as much as possible. The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court has acknowledged this repeatedly and uniformly, with explicit support to the idea that the criminal intervention of the State must be reduced to that strictly necessary and be