appealed only with respect to the allocation of attorneys’ fees. In its sentence of February 22, 1995, the First Chamber revoked the sentence at first instance, sentenced Mr. Mohamed to a three-year suspended prison sentence, and disqualified him from driving any vehicle for eight years. 13. The defense filed an extraordinary appeal based on claims that the conviction violated constitutional guarantees. Among the grounds raised was that the transit regulations invoked as the basis for the conviction and sentencing had not been in effect at the time of the traffic accident. In its decision of July 4, 1995, the First Chamber of the Chamber of Appeals indicated that, while the defense had presented what was in effect a technical mistake, the conviction had been based on a principle of objective responsibility that was not subject to dispute; accordingly, the Chamber declined to accept the appeal for review. The defense then presented an extraordinary appeal directly before the Supreme Court of the Nation. In a decision of September 19, 1995, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal as inadmissible. 14. The defense then filed an extraordinary appeal before the Supreme Court seeking revocation of the challenged decision on the basis of the principle of legality and the right to be heard, set forth in the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention. That appeal was dismissed via a decision of October 19, 1995, indicating that the challenged decision was not subject to such an appeal. The petitioners note in this regard that the very same composition of the Supreme Court had, in 1992, accepted just such a request for revocation. 15. The petitioners consider that the process carried out against Mr. Mohamed violated Article 9 of the American Convention, which prohibits the imposition of ex post facto laws. They contend that the First Chamber of the Chamber of Appeals based its conviction on violations of three provisions of the transit regulations of 1992. Those regulations were issued on April 27, 1992, subsequent to the traffic accident that took place on March 16, 1992. They consider that the penalization of conduct as illegal at the time of sentencing, when it was not illegal at the time of the facts, constitutes a violation of Article 9 of the American Convention. 16. The petitioners underline that, when the First Chamber of the Court of Appeals rejected their extraordinary appeal, it admitted that it had made a “material error” in referring to the regulations of 1992, which had not been in force at the time of the accident. The Chamber went on, however, to indicate that the penalty imposed had been based principally on an objective duty of care under the Criminal Code. The petitioners maintain that no such crime exists under the national legal order. The petitioners emphasize that Argentine law contains no express norm indicating that a person who violates the “objective duty of care” shall be convicted and penalized, and that the legal system does not permit the application of law by analogy or in the abstract. 17. The petitioners maintain that the Chamber of Appeals applied the Criminal Code not through a general principle, but by establishing violations of the transit regulations of 1992. Article 84 of the Criminal Code provides for a penalty ranging from six months to three years for any person who “through imprudence, negligence or lack of expertise in his or her art or profession, or failure to observe the regulations or duties under his or her responsibility, causes the death of another...” (por imprudencia, negligencia, impericia en su arte o profesión o inobservancia de los reglamentos o los deberes a su cargo, causare a otro la muerte). The petitioners consider that the