18 67. Therefore, The IACHR defines discrimination based on sexual orientation as any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference made against a person on the grounds that they are lesbian, gay or bisexual —or perceived as such—, which has the effect or the purpose —whether de jure or de facto—49 of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on the basis of equality, of human rights and fundamental freedoms, taking into account the social and cultural attributes that have been associated with those persons. Additionally, the Court has established that “[a]s regards the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation, any restriction of a right would need to be based on rigorous and weighty reasons. Furthermore, the burden of proof is inverted, which means that it is up to the authority to prove that its decision does not have a discriminatory purpose or effect.”50 68. On another level, various instruments and pronouncements underscore the indivisibility and interdependence of civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights on the other, and the duty of nondiscrimination and equality in the protection of these rights.51 The organs of the inter-American system specifically, have already identified the right to social security, the right to health and labor rights as ESCR that emanate from the OAS Charter.52 49 The IACHR understands that this discrimination can manifest itself either directly (intentional or “targeted”) or indirectly (involuntary or “by outcome”), and the latter can be de facto —when it manifests itself in practice— or de jure — when it emanates from a law or a provision—. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has written that in order for States parties to “guarantee” that the Covenant rights will be exercised without discrimination of any kind, discrimination must be eliminated both formally and substantively: (i) formal discrimination: Eliminating formal discrimination requires ensuring that a State’s constitution, laws and policy documents do not discriminate on prohibited grounds; (ii) Substantive discrimination: Merely addressing formal discrimination will not ensure substantive equality as envisaged and defined by Article 2(2). The effective enjoyment of Covenant rights is often influenced by whether a person is a member of a group characterized by the prohibited grounds of discrimination. Eliminating discrimination in practice requires paying sufficient attention to groups of individuals which suffer historical or persistent prejudice instead of merely comparing the formal treatment of individuals in similar situations. States parties must therefore immediately adopt the necessary measures to prevent, diminish and eliminate the conditions and attitudes which cause or perpetuate substantive or de facto discrimination. Direct discrimination also occurs when an individual is treated less favourably than another person in a similar situation for a reason related to a prohibited ground. Indirect discrimination refers to laws, policies or practices which appear neutral at face value, but have a disproportionate impact on the exercise of Covenant rights as distinguished by prohibited grounds of discrimination. UN, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20, Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art. 2, par. 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). E/C.12/GC/20, July 2, 2009, paragraphs 8, 10. 50 Cf. I/A Court H.R. Case of Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 24, 2012. Series C No. 239, par. 124. 51 IACHR, The work, education and resources of women: the road to equality in guaranteeing economic, social and cultural rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.143, Doc. 59, November 3, 2011, par. 29, citing, inter alia, IACHR, Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Paraguay, OEA/Ser./L./VII.110 doc. 52, March 9, 2001, par. 4; See also: Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, par. 5. 52 IACHR, The work, education and resources of women: the road to equality in guaranteeing economic, social and cultural rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.143, Doc. 59, November 3, 2011, par. 31, citing I/A Court H.R. Case of Acevedo Buendía et al. (“Discharged and Retired Employees of the Office of the Comptroller”) v. Peru. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 1, 2009, Series C No. 198, par. 106; IACHR, Report No. 38/09, Case 12,670, Admissibility and Merits, National Association of Ex-Employees of the Peruvian Social Security Institute et al. (Peru), March 27, 2009, par. 130; IACHR, Report No. 25/04, Petition12,361, Admissibility, Ana Victoria Sánchez Villalobos et al. (Costa Rica), March 11, 2004, paragraphs 52-70; IACHR, Report No. 27/09, Merits, Case 12,249, Jorge Odir Miranda Cortez et al. (El Salvador), March 20, 2009, paragraphs 77 and 79; IACHR, Report No. 100/01, Case 11,381, Milton García Fajardo et al. (Nicaragua), October 11, 2001, par. 95.; IACHR, Report No. 121/09, Petition 1186-04, Admissibility, Opario Lemoth Morris et al. (Buzos Miskitos) (Honduras), November 12, 2009, par. 50.