13 Convention. Taking into account the nature of this matter, the Court considers that its analysis should be reserved for the decision on the merits. 54. The Court points out that if the Commission did receive the complaint in this case while the criminal proceeding was pending a final judgment before the military court of the last instance, the mere filing of it did not amount to the Commission’s commencement of the processing of the matter. Strictly speaking, the receipt of the complaint, which derives from an act of the complainant, should not be confused with its admission and processing, which are accomplished by specific acts of the Commission itself, such as the decision to admit the complaint and, when appropriate, the notification of the State. 55. It must be noted that in this case the processing began several months after the complaint was lodged, when there was already a final judgment from the organ of final instance in the military jurisdiction. It was only then, by means of a notification on June 29, 1994, that the Commission informed Peru that the complaint had been submitted and required its observations concerning it, so that the State could provide that which it believed to be relevant in its defense. 56. The Court also indicates that the State did not allege the failure to exhaust domestic remedies before the Commission. By not doing so, it waived a means of defense that the Convention established in its favor and made a tacit admission of the non-existence of such remedies or their timely exhaustion, as has been stated in proceedings before organs of international jurisdiction (such as the European Court which has maintained that objections to inadmissibility should be raised at the initial stage of the proceedings before the Commission, unless it proves impossible to interpose them at the appropriate time for reasons that cannot be attributed to the Government), (cfr. Eur. Court H.R., Artico judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A No 37, paras. 24 et seq; Eur. Court H.R., judgment of Foti and others of 10 December 1982, Series A No. 56, paras. 46 et seq; Eur. Court H.R., Corigliano judgment of 10 December 1982, Series A No. 57, paras. 31 et seq; Eur. Court H.R., Bozano judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A No. 111, para. 44; Eur. Court H.R., Ciulla case decision of 23 March 1988, Series A No. 148, paras. 28 et seq., and Eur. Court H.R., de Jong, Baljet and van den Brick judgment of 22 May 1984, Series A No 77, paras. 35 et seq). and this Court has stated in earlier judgments. (In the Matter of Viviana Gallardo et. al. No. G 101/81. Series A, para 26; Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 1, para. 88, 89; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 2, para. 87, 88; Godínez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 3, para. 90, 91; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of March 15, 1989. Series C No. 6, para. 109; Neira Alegría et al., Preliminary Objections, Judgment of December 11, 1991. Series C No. 13, para. 30; Gangaram Panday Case, Judgment of January 21, 1994. Series C No. 16, para. 38 and 40; Castillo Páez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of January 30, 1996. Series C No. 24, para. 40; Loayza Tamayo Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of January 31, 1996. Serie C No. 25, para 40; in addition to the aforementioned judgments, as to the opportunity to present defenses, the Court has expressed its opinion in Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of January 21, 1994. Serie C No. 17, para. 60). 57. Consequently, the Court deems this preliminary objection to be inadmissible. Second Objection