14 58. The second objection raised by the State concerns the lack of competence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights first, to consider the petition lodged by the Fundación de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas (FASIC) on behalf of the aforementioned Chilean citizens; and second, to process this application when the original petition was lodged without establishing the exhaustion of the domestic remedies of Peru. 59. The Court summarizes as follows the positions of the State and the Commission with respect to this objection: a. The State asserted that the Commission received and initiated the processing of the complaint when the criminal proceeding was still ongoing against the alleged victims. It declared that the Commission is authorized to consider a matter when domestic resources have been exhausted and that the nonfulfilment of that norm "results in the incompetence of the Commission and [...] determines that the Court also lacks the competence to exercise jurisdiction and to render a valid decision on the merits of the disputed question." The State emphasized that the alleged victims or their attorneys could have filed writs of habeas corpus or of amparo but did not do so. b. The Commission pointed out that the second objection merely repeats the first. It observed that in October of 1993, due to the circumstances of the proceedings and the applicability of Article 6 of Decree-Law No. 25.659 "the alleged victims were not permitted the option of filing a writ of habeas corpus or of amparo." Moreover, the Commission asserted that even though the aforementioned Decree-Law was modified on November 25, 1993, by DecreeLaw No. 26.248, which allowed for the filing of a writ of habeas corpus in cases of treason against the fatherland, this legal modification "came about long after the final, ultimate, and executed judgment rendered in the exclusive military jurisdiction; as a result of which the remedy was ineffective for reasons of untimeliness. It also pointed out that this motion could not be filed, since it concerned the same events for which the prisoners had been tried. Likewise, the Commission stressed that the State had not demonstrated the effectiveness of that remedy for the release of persons tried before" a "faceless" military court. 60. The principal issue raised in the second objection, the failure of the timely exhaustion of domestic remedies, has been examined with regard to the first objection (supra 53 to 56), and for that reason the Court does not consider it necessary to repeat the same observations already stated. 61. In its explanation of the second objection, the State referred specifically to the remedies of habeas corpus and amparo. In previous decisions, the Court has maintained that habeas corpus is, in fact, the appropriate remedy to combat violations of the right to personal liberty (Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987. Series A No. 8, paras. 35 and 42). 62. In this matter, it is important to remember that Article 6(4) of Decree-Law No. 26,248 of November 12, 1993, which modified Decree-Law No. 25.659 on this point, as applied to the alleged victims provides that “writs of habeas corpus based