6 21. As I observed in my said separate opinion in that case, this judgment avoided and overcame an undue fragmentation and distortion of a complex, grave and continuing crime (the forced disappearance of persons), taking into account that, nowadays, the concept of a continuing situation has widespread support in international case law (paras. 10 to 19). Hence, the Court emphasized that the superior values that underlie the norms of protection shared by the international community as a whole, have primacy over the sword of Damocles of the dates on which State acceptance is manifested (para. 20, and cf. paras. 21 and 22). 22. Conversely and ironically, in the second operative paragraph of this judgment in the Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, what has been transformed into a “continuing situation” by a decision of the majority of the members of the Court, is not the situation allegedly violating human rights that was submitted to the Court’s consideration and decision, but rather the continuing situation imposed by the State on the Court that prevents it from exercising its jurisdiction; namely, to examine and rule on the matter – which, in my opinion, is almost a juridical absurdity. It is well known that the history of juridical thought, and even human thought in general, does not make linear progress, but I sincerely hope that, in a temporal dimension, the second operative paragraph of this judgment of the Court is only a stumbling block that has to be overcome, a mishap on the long road that has to be traveled. 23. In keeping with the Court’s recent case law, its judgment in the Trujillo Oroza case (supra), its abovementioned judgments on competence in the Constitutional Court and Ivcher Bronstein cases, and on preliminary objections in the Hilaire, Benjamin and Constantine cases, are also notable international advances in international case law in general and its legal grounds. The last two cases are today part of the history of human rights in Latin America, with widespread positive repercussions on other continents; moreover, they have created expectations of continued progress in the Court’s case law in the same direction. 10 24. In contrast to these advances, this judgment of the Court on preliminary objections in the Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador is, data venia, particularly with regard to the second operative paragraph, and the corresponding considering paragraphs Nos. 66 to 79; a regrettable step backwards. Consequently, I dissent firmly from what I deem to be an unacceptable capitulation to State voluntarism which is no longer sustainable today, and which also militates against the actual process of jurisdictionalization of international law itself, revealed by recent advances in the ancient ideal of the realization of justice at the international level also (cf. infra). 25. The terms of the defendant State’s recognition of the jurisdiction of the InterAmerican Court on contentious matters are also inadmissible and invalid as regards another specific aspect; namely, when the State reserves the faculty to terminate the recognition of this jurisdiction “when it considers this opportune.” This caveat conflicts with the ruling of the Court in the abovementioned judgments on competence in the Constitutional Court and Ivcher Bronstein cases. 26. In another line of thought still relating to this case, the only limitation filed by the defendant State referred to in the first operative paragraph of this judgment – regarding which little or nothing could be done, owing to the degree of stagnation of 10 . Cf., for example, A. Salado Osuna, Los Casos Peruanos ante la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Lima, Edit. Normas Legales, 2004, pp. 94-131.