8 their object and purpose and, accordingly, in establishing limits to State voluntarism. From all this, one can detect a new vision of the relations between public power and the human being, which is summed up, ultimately, in the recognition that the State exists for the human being, and not vice-versa." 12 IV. Compulsory international jurisdiction: new reflections de lege ferenda. 30. Despite the unfortunate decision of the Inter-American Court, in the second operative paragraph of this judgment on preliminary objections in the Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, it should be recalled that, in its abovementioned judgments on preliminary objections in the Hilaire, Benjamin, and Constantine cases, and also in its previous judgments on competence in the Constitutional Court and Ivcher Bronstein cases, the Court safeguarded the integrity of the provisions of Article 62 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and thus made a valuable contribution to strengthening the international jurisdiction and achieving the ancient ideal of international justice. 31. On the positive side, it should be noted that, despite all the difficulties, this ideal has been revitalized and has gained ground nowadays, with the encouraging significant expansion of the international judicial function, reflected by the creation of new international tribunals. For some time, I have been insisting that the time has come to finally overcome the regrettable lack of automatism of the international jurisdiction and, in particular, of the inter-American system for the protection of human rights. 32. Owing to the distortions resulting from their practice in this area, the States are now faced with a dilemma that should have been overcome long ago: or they continue adhering to the anachronic voluntarist conception of international law, abandoning the prospect of the primacy of law over political interests, or they return to and achieve determinedly the ideal of constructing a more cohesive and institutionalized international community in light of the primacy of law and the search for justice, moving resolutely from jus dispositivum to jus cogens, 13 convinced that, ultimately, the international juridical system is a necessary rather than a voluntary system. 33. I will now repeat what I stated in my concurring opinion in the judgment on preliminary objections of September 1, 2001, of the Inter-American Court in the Hilaire case (and also in the Benjamin and Constantine cases): "The time has come to consider, in particular, in a future protocol of amendments to the procedural part of the American Convention on Human Rights, aiming at strengthening its mechanisms of protection, the possibility of an amendment to Article 62 of the American Convention, in order to render this clause also mandatory, in conformity with its character of fundamental clause (cláusula pétrea), thus establishing the automatism of the 12 . IACtHR, Blake v. Guatemala (Reparations), Judgment of January 22, 1999, Series C, No. 48, Separate opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, paras. 32-34. 13 . And always bearing mind that the protection of fundamental rights places us firmly in the domain of jus cogens. In this regard, when intervening in the discussions of March 12, 1986, of the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations, I referred to the evident incompatibility between the concept of jus cogens and the voluntarist conception of international law, which is not even able to explain the establishment of rules of general international law; cf. UN, United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations (Vienna, 1986) - Official Records, volume I, N.Y., U.N., 1995, pp. 187-188 (intervention by A.A. Cançado Trindade).