4 corresponding to these three categories are all victims – without any need for further qualification – of the violation suffered. 13. The definition of the existence of victims and their identification – and, evidently, this does not necessarily have to be done by the first and last names recorded on a certification from the registry office in accordance with the strict formalities of domestic law – forms part of the presentation of the facts by the entity that submits the case to the consideration of the Inter-American Court. Hence, the Commission’s application should include a list of the victims, together with all the facts of the case. 14. The Court’s Rules of Procedure (the fourth version, resulting from the Court’s observations and experience, in force in recent years) are explicit in this regard when they state that, in the application brief, the Commission “shall include [...] the name and address of the alleged victims…” (Article 33(1)). This provision should be related to the definition of the alleged victim contained in Article 2(30) of this instrument: “the person whose rights under the Convention are alleged to have been violated.” Evidently, as the Court’s case law has stated insistently, this does not prevent the victim or his representatives from submitting considerations on the violations committed, provided these refer to the facts set forth by the body authorized to file the international proceedings on human rights issues, in accordance with its attributes under the Convention. 15. The realism inherent in human rights proceedings, the purpose of knowing the historic truth, and the exclusion or avoidance of excessive formalities, does not excuse the Court from complying with its obligations in keeping with its jurisdictional function, or authorize it to conduct investigations or assume hypotheses that are the responsibility of the actor rather than the judge. It would be a cause for concern if the Court began to interpret at its own discretion – in reality, to modify – the terms of its attributes and thus generate legal uncertainty; this would impair the objectivity of the proceedings and the rights of the parties. The Court’s conduct, within the framework of the competence attributed to it by the norms on which its powers are based, is the guarantee of legal certainty and, thus, justice. It expresses the rule of law and banishes any temptation to introduce discretionality or arbitrariness. 16. Exceeding these limits, even for (possibly) plausible reasons would erode or annul the trust that the Court deserves, which, in turn, has a favorable effect on justice and the justiciable facts. Evidently, in certain circumstances, it might be desirable to modify – and expand – the Court’s jurisdiction, but this must be accomplished by reforming its regulations, also pursuant to the rule of law, and not by its own actions that lack legal basis, even though they may be attractive for some justiciable facts and for judges who embark of this dangerous route. 17. Although the formal presentation of a contentious case usually includes a precise indication of the alleged violations, the article of the Convention to which these violations refer, and the persons affected by them, there are some complex cases in which the application does not contain the elements to precisely – and I am not saying perfectly or absolutely – identify the individuals harmed by the violation. In such cases, the Court may and should examine the information in the application very carefully and respond as extensively as possible to the unresolved issues. 18. In this way, the Court complies with its duty and serves the cause of justice and the protection of human rights. What it cannot do, is exceed its powers, add