3 a. US$ 53,104.77 (fifty-three thousand one hundred four United States dollars and seventy-seven cents) or its equivalent in Ecuador’s national currency, to Mr. Rafael Iván Suárez Rosero; b. US$ 23,517.00 (twenty-three thousand five hundred seventeen United States dollars) or its equivalent in Ecuador’s national currency, to Mrs. Margarita Ramadán Burbano; and c. US$ 10,000.00 (ten thousand United States dollars) or its equivalent in Ecuador’s national currency, to the minor Micaela Suárez Ramadán. [...;] that for costs and expenses the State of Ecuador [must pay], in the manner and under the conditions stipulated in paragraphs 101 to 112 of the judgment, the sum of US$ 6,520.00 (six thousand five hundred twenty United States dollars) or its equivalent in Ecuador’s national currency to Mr. Alejandro Ponce Villacís, and the sum of US$ 6,010.45 (six thousand ten United States dollars and forty-five cents) or its equivalent in Ecuadorian currency to Mr. Richard Wilson. and that the payments ordered shall be exempt from any existing or future taxes or levies (operative paragraph four, subparagraph b.). 9. After examining Ecuador’s submissions, the Court has concluded that despite the rather general terms in which the State’s request is formulated, the latter is seeking an interpretation of two specific and different points. 10. The first concerns the compensation ordered for the victim and his next of kin. The State obviously understands that the amounts in question are not subject to taxation at time of payment. Its doubt is whether the “interest earned and the use made” of the proceeds from the compensatory damages subsequent to payment would also be tax exempt. 11. The second question that the request for interpretation poses concerns the payment ordered for the victim’s attorneys which, according to the State, “is taxable.” 12. Having established the two points raised in the request for interpretation, the Court will now proceed to examine its admissibility. IV ADMISSIBILITY 13. Under Article 67 of the Convention, the request for interpretation must be filed “within ninety days from the date of notification of the judgment.” The Court has established that the State was given notice of the judgment on reparations in the instant case on January 25, 1999. The request for interpretation was, therefore, presented within the required time limit (supra 2). 14. The Commission’s comments were also submitted within the established time limit and will therefore be considered. 15. Mr. Suárez Rosero’s comments, on the other hand, were submitted after the time limit had passed because, according to him, the notice soliciting his comments was sent to him only one day before the deadline fell due, the Court has reviewed the date-of-receipt printed by his facsimile machine, which shows that the Secretariat’s note of May 4, 1999, reference number CDH-11,273/252, was sent via fax to Mr. Richard Wilson, one of Mr. Suárez Rosero’s attorneys, on May 5, 1999. Therefore,