compatible with the American Convention.”14 In this regard, the Court recalled Article 23(2) of the Convention, which indicates that “the law may regulate the exercise of the rights and opportunities referred to in the preceding paragraph [concerning political rights] only on the basis of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil and mental capacity, or a criminal conviction by a competent court.” And, in this regard, concluded that “in this case, which refers to a restriction imposed by means of sanctions, it should have been a “criminal conviction imposed by a competent judge,” adding that “[n]one of these requirements has been fulfilled, because the body that imposed the said sanctions was not a “competent judge,” there was no “criminal conviction” and the sanctions were not applied as the result of “criminal proceedings,” in which the judicial guarantees embodied in Article 8 of the American Convention would have to have been respected.”15 In short, it could be inferred from the above that the Court, in its interpretation of Article 23(2) of the Convention, understood the ordinary meaning of the expression “competent judge” in keeping with the principle of good faith, the context of the terms of the Convention, and its object and purpose16 and, consequently, considered that the Comptroller General of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, even though he was exercising the disciplinary and sanctionary powers granted by law, and having heard the victim in accordance with the previously-regulated procedure, in reality was not a “competent judge,” terms that could well be equated to those used by Article 8(1); in other words, to those of “competent, independent and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law.” Notwithstanding the above, it could be understood that the terms “judge or tribunal” employed in Article 8(1) also include “the State bodies (that) adopt decisions on the determination of the rights of the individual”17 or “any State body that exercises functions of a substantially jurisdictional nature”;18 in other words, bodies that are not formal judges or tribunals, but which act as such. In this regard, it should be recalled that the essential and distinctive function of judges is, without doubt, the settlement of disputes; in other words, the exercise of the contentious jurisdiction. Accordingly, should there be a dispute with regard to “the determination of (the) rights and obligation of a civil, labor, fiscal or any other nature,”19 they would evidently be decided by a judge or tribunal. To the contrary, the essence of this judicial function is not the exercise of the noncontentious or voluntary jurisdiction, since this relates to matters that are outside the judicial sphere and belong to the administrative sphere, but whose hearing and settlement is conferred by law on a judge or tribunal, even though there is no dispute about them and, for different reasons, including the possibility that disputes could arise in relation to them. Without this express assignment by law, a judge or tribunal could not hear and decide such matters and, therefore, the pertinent matters would continue being the competence of administrative authorities and the non-contentious or voluntary jurisdiction would not exist with regard to them. Consequently, it is based on the foregoing jurisdiction that, on the one hand, if there is no dispute as regards “the determination of (the) rights and obligations of a civil, labor, 14 Idem, para. 104. 15 Idem, paras. 104 and 107. 16 See my concurring opinion, Case of López Mendoza v. Venezuela. Judgment on merits, reparations and costs, September 1, 2011. 17 Para. 118. 18 Dissenting opinion of Judges Abreu and Medina, cit. 19 Art. 8(1). 5