126. The Court recalls that, under the provisions of article 31 of Law 17,613, two rights should be granted to those who complied with the said requirements: (i) recognition as a creditor of the Banco de Montevideo or the Banco La Caja Obrera, based on which they became proportional shareholders in the Asset Recovery Fund of the respective bank for the nominal amount that it had been determined was transferred without their consent, and (ii) the right to receive from the State a complement to their proportional share up to (between their own share and the complement provided by the State) a nominal maximum amount of US$100,000.00 (one hundred thousand United States dollars) or its equivalent in other currencies. This last right was recognized to them, because it was considered that their situation was the same as that of the depositors with a checking, savings or fixed term account (supra para. 97). 127. In addition to stipulating these rights, the said article 31 created: a special procedure to deal with the petitions of those who considered that they fulfilled the corresponding requirements; and called for the establishment of a technical committee (the Advisory Commission) responsible for examining the petitions and advising the Board of the Central Bank of Uruguay, the administrative body that had to adopt the corresponding decisions (supra paras. 77 and 79). The norms contained in the Central Bank’s Administrative Rules of Procedure would be applied in this special procedure, while the General Procedural Code would be applied to the assessment of evidence (supra para. 83). 128. The Court emphasizes that the body of evidence does not show that the remedies available under the ordinary justice system, which decided the actions against the Banco de Montevideo, could apply article 31 of Law 17,613 and determine the rights established therein (infra para. 226). This determination needed to be made by the administrative body responsible for the said procedure, which was created especially to respond to the claims of those persons who allegedly complied with the requirements of the said norm. B.1) Material aspect of the right to be heard in the procedure before the administrative body (the Central Bank) Arguments of the parties 129. The Court finds that several arguments of the Inter-American Commission and of the representatives are addressed at questioning the effectiveness of the special administrative procedure because it did not allow an adequate examination of the requirement of consent, which they consider to be an essential element for analysis in the procedure under article 31 of Law 17,613. The Court considers that the violations alleged should be examined in relation to the right to be heard in the procedure before the Central Bank. 130. In this regard, the Inter-American Commission argued that the presumption of consent by the Advisory Commission contradicts the principle of the “material truth” of the administrative due process, “making the special remedy created by Congress to resolve this situation illusory and its very existence ineffective.” According to the InterAmerican Commission, the Advisory Commission did not take into account that many of the certificates were renewed without the client’s consent, because the General Manager of the Banco de Montevideo gave “instructions [to the Banco de Montevideo branch managers] that they should automatically renew all the deposits in order to avoid a hemorrhage of funds.” In addition, it indicated that the Advisory Commission made its decisions without analyzing the existence of fraud which, at the time, had been publicly denounced and had resulted in criminal proceedings against the bank’s owners and officers. 54