the testimonies contained in the record of those who said that the policemen in charge of the operation fired in the direction of the room, and also the testimony of Luis Alciviades Valdiviezo, who said that he saw one of the two policemen going to the place where Policeman Valencia was hiding, that two shots were heard, and that then everything went quiet. The Commission also notes that no reference was made to the fact that the two policemen purportedly shook hands after coming out of the room and said that Valencia was dead. Nor was the testimony of the child Franklyn Antonio García disproved, according to whom the shots did not come from inside the room where Mr. Valencia Hinojosa, but rather the shots were fired by the policemen Cabeza and Piedra. 155. In addition to these omissions, no measures were taken with respect to the death threats that were reportedly made by the policemen during the operation, nor were those references included as relevant circumstantial evidence in the investigation. 156. In this regard, the Commission observes that the standard of the European Court of Human Rights in Masneva v. Ukraine for the purpose of satisfying the requirement of due diligence in the investigation when the facts suggest the possibility of a suicide or a homicide caused by state agents is that “[a]n investigation will not be effective unless all the evidence is properly analysed and the conclusions are consistent and reasoned.”141 157. Based on the foregoing, the Commission concludes that the investigation was neither diligent nor intended to elucidate the facts and, even though its findings continue to disclose possible evidence of the responsibility of state agents, that evidence was neither investigated nor suitably disproved. In conclusion, coupled with the lack of independence and impartiality on the part of the authorities that participated in the investigation, the Commission considers that it was also not carried out diligently and effectively, and therefore its results were obtained in violation of Articles 8 and 25 Convention. 3. Reasonable time 158. The Commission recalls that Article 8(1) of the Convention establishes as one of the guarantees of a fair trial that tribunals must reach a decision on cases submitted for their consideration within a reasonable time. The Inter-American Court has found that a prolonged delay may constitute, in itself, a violation of the right to a fair trial,142 and that, therefore, it is for the State to explain and prove why it has required more time than would be reasonable to deliver final judgment in a specific case. 143 159. With respect to whether the investigations were carried out in a reasonable time, in its observations on the merits, the State recounted a number of cases in which the organs of the system declared that the delay was unreasonable and, after comparing them with the duration of the present case, concluded that there was no unwarranted delay and that, to the contrary, the judges acted efficiently and the proceeding lasted four years, three months, and one day. For their part, the petitioners said that the time that it took the State to carry out the investigation and complete the criminal proceeding exceeded the limits established in its own system of laws. 160. In that regard, the Commission considers that it would be useful to point out that the reasonableness of the time taken to conduct an investigation is not measured in comparison to other cases presented to the inter-American system, but rather on a case-by-case basis according to relevant criteria 141ECHR , Masneva v. Ukraine, Application no. 5952/07, 20 December 2011, § 69. 142I/A Court H.R., Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru. Judgment of November 25, 2005. Series C No. 137, par. 166; Case of Gómez Palomino v. Peru. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 136, par. 85; Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Judgment of June 15, 2005. Series C No. 124, par. 160. 143 par. 142. I/A Court H.R., Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111