12 63. The operational chain of command reached the highest levels of military authority, passing through National Intelligence Service advisor Vladimiro Montesinos Torres and extending all the 32 way up to then President Fujimori. A continuous communications system was in place throughout the 33 operation. 64. Peruvian Army General Augusto Jaime Patiño, who took orders from the Commander General of the Army, was head of the Tactical Operations Center and constituted the second level of command; Colonel José Williams Zapata, who commanded the group that would carry out the 34 intervention, represented a third level of command. Vladimiro Montesinos was responsible for the intelligence side of the operation by order of the President of the Republic. Montesinos, in turn, ordered Colonel Roberto Edmundo Huamán Azcurra to make use of the information obtained from inside the residence. Colonel Huamán Azcurra ordered Colonel Jesús Zamudio Aliaga to take charge of digging the tunnels, securing the houses adjacent to the residence of the Ambassador, and filming and 35 photographing the rescue operation. 65. After being informed that the conditions for the intervention were in place, President Fujimori, through the chain of command, order the operation to begin. After detonating several underground explosions, approximately 143 commanders formed into different groups entered the Embassy residence through tunnels, while some of the MRTA members were playing a game of “fulbito.” Lieutenant Gustavo Jiménez Chávez, Lieutenant Colonel Juan Alfonso Valer Sandoval, hostage Carlos 36 Giusti Acuña, and all fourteen MRTA members perished in the operation. The remaining 71 hostages 37 were freed alive. An additional 14 State agents and 8 hostages were wounded during the operation. 66. The tactic of “selective instinctive shooting” (SIS) was employed during the operation. It consists of firing three shots in two seconds to the vital parts of the adversary, followed by a shot to the 38 head of the enemy; “if the criminal was still alive, he was given the coup de grâce.” 32 Appendix 1, TRC, 2.66. EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS IN THE RESIDENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN (1997), TRC, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20VII/Casos%20Ilustrativos-UIE/2.66.%20%20ENABJADA%20JAPON.pdf Appendix 3, Appendix 8, Prosecutor’s Inquiry [vista fiscal] of the Public Ministry, dated April 14, 2003, Appendix of the petitioners’ communication of February19, 2003. See also, Appendix 3, Non-certified copy of the order to initiate proceedings of June 11, 2002, appendix to the State’s communication of August 5, 2008 and February 6, 2009, and appendix to the representatives’ communication of April 22, 2008. Appendix to the State’s communication of December 1, 2003, appendix submitted at the public hearing. 33 Report No. 01-1 Special Forces Div. [Div. FFEE] April 1997, Operation Chavín de Huántar (Hostage Rescue Operation), Appendix 7 to the State’s communication of February 6, 2009, and public hearing. Prosecutor’s Inquiry [vista fiscal], April 14, 2003, documents provided at the public hearing, Appendix to the petitioners’ communication of February 19, 2003, see in this regard, the summary of the testimony given by Guillermo Castillo Meza, Antonio Olivares Príncipes, Ronald Javier Pérez Pezo. 34 Appendix 1, TRC, 2.66. EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS IN THE RESIDENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN (1997), TRC, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20VII/Casos%20Ilustrativos-UIE/2.66.%20%20ENABJADA%20JAPON.pdf. 35 Appendix 1, TRC, 2.66. EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS IN THE RESIDENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN (1997), TRC, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20VII/Casos%20Ilustrativos-UIE/2.66.%20%20ENABJADA%20JAPON.pdf. 36 Autopsy Protocol, Volume 4. 37 Appendix 1, TRC, 2.66. EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS IN THE RESIDENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN (1997), TRC, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20VII/Casos%20Ilustrativos-UIE/2.66.%20%20ENABJADA%20JAPON.pdf. See Appendix 2, Appendix 15, Report of the Intervention of the Forces of Order in Compliance with Operations Plan Chavín de Huántar, appendix submitted at the public hearing. See also, Appendix 3, Non-certified copy of the order to initiate proceedings of June 11, 2002, appendix to the State’s communication of August 5, 2008 and February 6, 2009 and appendix to the representatives’ communication of April 22, 2008. Appendix to the State’s communication of 1º December 2003, appendix submitted at the public hearing. 38 Appendix 1, TRC, 2.66. EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS IN THE RESIDENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN (1997), TRC, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20VII/Casos%20Ilustrativos-UIE/2.66.%20%20ENABJADA%20JAPON.pdf See also, Appendix 4, expanded statement of January 11, 2002, by General José Daniel Williams Zapata. See the Statement of Lt. Col. Luis Alberto Donoso Volpe, a member of Group 5, before the Public Ministry.