106. The petitioners say that the PDH appealed the decision and that on July 6, 2009, Talca Appellate Court overturned the judgment, sentenced Lecaros Carrasco to five years and one day of imprisonment as the perpetrator of aggravated homicide, and confirmed the ruling in all other respects. 107. The petitioners say that on April 14, 2010, the Supreme Court, examining a cassation appeal alleging material errors filed by the convicted man, vacated the ruling sua sponte, having considered that it contained formal errors, and issued a substitute judgment. The new judgment, applying the mitigating circumstances of irreproachable past conduct and partial lapse of the statutory time period, sentenced the accused to five years’ imprisonment and, having regard to the length of the sentence imposed and the fact that he suffered from physical complaints were verified in a medical report, granted him supervised release. 14. Case of Miguel Antonio Figueroa Mercado and family 108. On August 16, 2010, the petitioners expanded the petition lodged on behalf of Miguel Antonio Figueroa Mercado and his family. 109. The petitioners say that the alleged victim was a member of the Communist Party and that on the night of September 29, 1973, while he was in his house, where he lived as a trade union leader in the community of Fundo Peñuelas, Villa Alegre District, there arrived two vehicles, a patrol comprising 10 or 12 soldiers, and a representative of the Carabineros, who was the chief of the police station for the sector known as Pataguas, Lagunillas, or Polvareda. They say that the agents surrounded the house, entered it, detained the alleged victim on orders from the commanding officer in San Javier without showing any detention order, put him in a military jeep, and took him to an unknown destination, despite telling his daughter Sara Eugenia Figueroa Quezada that they were taking him to Linares. He has been missing ever since. 110. They say that the alleged victim’s partner, María Rebeca Quezada Cifuentes, immediately began looking for him at the Artillery School Regiment in Linares, hospitals, and police stations in Linares and San Javier, to no avail. They say that, owing to the precarious circumstances in which she was left and having several young children in her charge, coupled with the fact that she lived a long way from the city, she was unable to approach any human rights organization to present her case. 111. They say that, subsequently, in 1990, her son Carlos Antonio Figueroa Quezada notified the CNVR of the incident, with the result that Miguel Antonio Figueroa Mercado was classified as a victim of human rights violations as a disappeared detainee. The petitioners say that the CNRR, the CNVR’s legal successor, filed a complaint with the First Court of First Instance in and for Linares. On July 3, 2003, the PDH became a coplaintiff in the proceeding and on September 8 that year, the magistrate presiding in the case tried Army Lieutenant Colonel (r) Claudio Abdón Lecaros Carrasco as the perpetrator of the crime. Subsequently, the judge declared himself as lacking competence, since the crime had occurred in another territorial jurisdiction. As a result, the case was transferred to an exclusively devoted judge in San Javier. They say that the judge brought charges on November 21, 2003. 112. The petitioners say that, subsequently, the Supreme Court assigned the cases to the judge of the Talca Appellate Court, who dismissed the case on July 18, 2008, citing extinction of criminal action. 113. The petitioners say that the PDH appealed that judgment and that the Talca Appellate Court overturned same by a ruling dated April 17, 2009, finding that the crimes constituted unlawful and arbitrary detention, not aggravated kidnapping, and therefore sentenced the accused to 540 days’ imprisonment, granting him a suspended sentence. An examination of the judgment indicates that the Talca Appellate Court considered that as there was only certainty with respect to the alleged victim’s detention, but not with regard to his subsequent fate, it was unable to conclude that he had been permanently abducted and in the power of the convicted man, for which reason, as that circumstance was not known or if he was deceased, permanent abduction could not be construed. 114. They say that the PDH challenged that judgment by means of an application for cassation and that on May 18, 2010, the Supreme Court, accepting the cassation application, vacated the judgment and issued 18