available domestic remedies that are appropriate and efficient for remedying the alleged violation. 48. With regard to compliance with the requirement of previous exhaustion of domestic law remedies provided for in Article 46.1.a of the American Convention, the petitioners indicate that “the situation of mistrust with regard to the administration of justice in Peru, led the Consolidated Petroleum Workers Union of Peru for PETROPERU S.A. to seek redress from many agencies.” The petitioners point out that with a Judicial Branch largely conditioned by the Executive Branch, they brought multiple motions domestically to give the State the opportunity to resolve the violations via its own means. However, they state that the remedies they were obliged to exhaust were those suitable, appropriate, and effective and these did not exist in Peru at the time the events occurred, as per their allegations. 49. The State points out that the petitioners had access to judicial remedies before independent courts. In the State’s opinion, the judicial decisions denying the claims of the petitioners were not the result of a Judicial Branch that lacked independence and impartiality, but rather due to lack of compliance with procedural requirements as set forth in legislation and to the insufficiency of the petitioners’ arguments. 50. The Commission observes that with regard to the actions that the petitioners say they have undertaken, that there is an action for amparo requesting non-application of Executive Decree 72-25-PCM, via which the Board of Directors of Petróleos de Perú was authorized to make use of Decree 26120, by finding that it violated their constitutional rights to work and to due process. 15 The petitioners alleged in their motion that since they had not been duly notified of the personnel reduction process, in spite of repeated petitions to the Labor Authority, their constitutional rights to guarantees of due process and defense had been infringed, because they did not know the reasons or the procedures on which the dismissals were based.16 51. According to the evidence alleged by the parties, the IACHR finds that on March 18, 1996, the Specialized Civil Court of Talara declared the complaint “INADMISSIBLE” on the argument that even if Article 3 of Law 23506 states that guarantee actions apply in the case of a violation or threat based on a norm that is incompatible with the Constitution, Article 200 of the Constitution states that the “action for amparo” is not filed against legal norms, nor against judicial decisions issued in a regular proceeding.” Thus, the judge believed that it was “evident that the Executive Decree being questioned involves a general declaration, therefore the amparo is not the relevant appropriate means.” 52. On July 3, 1996, the Second Civil Division of Piura rendered the lower court judgment “UPHELD on its own merits […] and because it is pursuant to the Law; the Action for Amparo is not the appropriate means for declaring the Constitutionality of 15 The petitioners based their request on Article 3 of Law 23506 which states: “Article 3.—Admissibility of the action with regard to unconstitutional rules. The guarantee actions are applicable even if the violation or threat is based on a rule that is incompatible with the Constitution. In this instance, failure to apply the norm shall be determined in the same proceeding.” 16 The petitioners pointed out that they were not notified of the order admitting the file submitted by the company to the Regional Labor Authority and that “since there is no admission order, we were not notified of the procedure that was initiated, so that we could exercise our right to defense in accordance with Article 139 (3) and (4) of the Constitution, which establishes that no one can be subjected to procedures other than those previously established, as well as the publicity of the processes.” 12