19 Forces. The burdensome consequences of his act are much more serious.” Independent of this, the way Mr. Usón Ramírez proceeded, in view of the State, “showed there was animus injuriando, which is nothing but the awareness and will to dishonor and discredit the Armed Forces.” The State pointed out that “it results from the excerpts of the transcribed interview that Mr. Usón [Ramírez] made use of his freedom of expression[,] but even making an apology of crime.” According to the State, “the analysis of the statements made by each one of the participants, within the context of the [TV] program, evidences that the participation of [Mr. Usón Ramírez] was quite far from a technical statement on a specific topic, but it was a truly insulting remark against the National Armed Forces. 72. When analyzing this topic, as on other occasions,56 the Court shall examine the existing alternatives to reach the lawful purpose and state clearly their injurious nature. 73. The Court has pointed out that Criminal Law is the most restrictive and severe means to establish liabilities for illicit behavior57, particularly when sanctions involve deprivation of liberty. Therefore, the use of the criminal way shall respond to the principle of minimum intervention, due to the nature of criminal law as ultima ratio. This means that in a democratic society the punitive power shall only be exercised insofar as it is strictly necessary to protect the fundamental juridical goods from the most serious attacks that damage or jeopardize it. The opposite would lead to the abusive exercise of the punitive power of the State58. 74. The need to use the criminal forum to impose further liabilities for exercising the right to freedom of expression shall be analyzed particularly with caution and shall depend on the peculiarities of each case. To that end, the good to be protected, the extreme seriousness of the behavior of the issuer, the fraud used, the characteristics of the unfairly caused damage, the characteristics of the person whose honor or reputation is to be safeguarded, the means used to cause damages and any other data that shows the absolute need to use criminal measures in a truly exceptional manner, shall be considered. At all times the burden of the proof shall be with the accusing party. 59 75. To that end, the Tribunal has considered on previous occasions that the exercise of the punitive power of the State has been abusive and unnecessary to protect the right to honor, when the criminal statute in question does not establish clearly what behaviors involve serious damage to such right.60 That is what occurred in the case of Mr. Usón Ramirez. A.4) Strict proportionality of the measure 56 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment November 21, 2007. Series C No. 170, para. 93; Case of Castañeda Gutman v. México. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment August 6, 2008. Series C No. 184, para. 196, and Case of Kimel, supra note 41, para. 74. 57 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 38, para. 104; Case of Kimel, supra note 41, para. 76, and Case of Palamara Iribarne, supra note 47, para. 79. 58 Cf. Case of Kimel, supra note 41, para. 76. 59 Cf. Case of Kimel, supra note 41, para. 78. See also Mamère v. France, no. 12697/03, § 27, ECHR 2006; ECHR, Castells v. Spain. judgment of 23 of April 1992, § 42, § 46. Series A no. 236, and Cumpana and Mazare v. Romania [GC], no. 33348/96, § 115, ECHR 2004-XI. 60 Cf. Case of Kimel, supra note 41, para. 76 (“The broad codification of crimes of slander and insult can result contrary to the principle of minimal intervention and of ultima ratio of criminal law.”)