22 requiring a more significant circulation of reports and opinions about matters of public interest.71 84. In this case, the remarks made by Mr. Usón Ramírez were related to matters that were clearly of public interest. Despite the existence of public interest regarding the events in Fuerte Mara, to which the Armed Forces depende, Mr. Usón Ramírez was tried and judgmentd without taking into account the requirements of the American Convention regarding the larger tolerance required regarding any affirmations and considerations expressed by citizens exercising their democratic right. 85. On the other hand, the Tribunal observes that in the process before this Court the State underscored that Mr. Usón Ramírez made several statements that were not related to the subject of public interest regarding the use of flamethrowers, but that could be understood as insult, offense and contempt of the Armed Forces. However, as pointed about above (supra paras. 37 and 38), the national tribunals based the judgment of Mr. Usón Ramírez on the facts related to the alleged imputation to the authorities of Fuerte Mara of “premeditation” in the use of a flamethrower.72 The other statements by Mr. Usón Ramírez in such Television interview do not form part of the reasons for the judgment, as indicated by the Venezuelan domestic jurisdiction that determined that facts on whose basis Mr. Usón Ramírez was tried; therefore, the Court shall not refer to them. 86. To that end, the Court observes that, on the one hand, the national tribunal considered that Mr. Usón Ramírez had issued an opinion, not only made an affirmation and, on the other hand, that such opinion was affirming a fact that was not true (supra paras. 40 and 42). The Court has already pointed out that opinions cannot be considered true or false. As such, an opinion cannot be the object of any sanction,73 even more so when such opinion is conditioned by evidencing facts on which it is based. In this case, when conditioning his opinion in such a way, it is clear that Mr. Usón Ramírez was not stating that a premeditated crime had been committed, but that in his opinion such a crime seemed to have been committed in case the hypothesis about the use of the flamethrower was true. An opinion conditioned in such a way cannot be subjected elements which question veracity.74 Furthermore, the above shows that Mr. Usón Ramírez lacked any specific intention to insult, offend, or disparage since if he had had the intent to do so, he would not have conditioned his opinion in such a way. A contrary reasoning, i.e., establishing disproportionate sanctions for giving opinions on an alleged illicit fact of public interest that involved military institutions and their members, thus providing a larger and automatic protection to their 70 Cf. Case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment on February 6, 2001. Series C No. 74, para. 152; Case of Kimel, supra note 41, para. 87, and Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 38, para. 83. 71 Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa, supra note 40, para. 113; Case of Kimel, supra note 41, para. 87, and Case of Claude Reyes et al., supra note 44, para. 81. 72 According to the judgment against him, Mr. Usón Ramírez was condemned “for having given his opinion and made false assertions involving military personal.” Cf. Judgment of the First Military Tribunal of Judgment on November 8, 2004, supra note 22, f. 396. Similarly, according to the appeals tribunal, Mr. Usón Ramírez was charged because “what he expressed constitutes Slander against the National Armed Forces, by having affirmed a false fact.” Cf. Judgment of January 27, 2005 of the Martial Court of Military Criminal Circuit of Caracas, in relation to the appeal remedy, supra note 22, f. 1884. 73 Cf. Case of Kimel, supra nota 41, para. 93. See also, ECHR, Lingens v. Austria, judgment of 8 July 1986, § 46, Series A No. 103. 74 Cf. Case of Kimel, supra note 41, para. 93. See also, ECHR, Lingens, supra note 73..