23 honor or reputation, without considering the larger protection of freedom of expression in a democratic society, is incompatible with Article 13 of the American Convention.75 87. Lastly, as pointed out above,76 even when the Inter-American Court cannot and does not mean to replace the national authority in individualizing the sanctions for any crime under its domestic law, the Tribunal is concerned about the lack of proportionality between the response of the State to the expressions by Mr. Usón Ramírez and the juridical benefit affected – here, the honor or reputation of the Armed Forces. To that end, the Tribunal reiterates that both rationality and proportionality shall guide the behavior of the State when exercising its punitive power, thus avoiding the leniency which is characteristic of impunity such as abuse of discretion regarding the determination of criminal penalties. * * * 88. Taking into account all the above, the Court concludes that imposition of liabilities on Mr. Usón Ramírez for the crime of slander against the Armed Forces violated his right to freedom of expression, since the requirements of legality, necessity, and proportionality were not respected when restricting such right. As a consequence, the State violated the principle of legality and right to freedom of expression set forth in the Articles 9 and 13(1) and 13(2) of the American Convention, in relation with the general obligation of respecting and guaranteeing the rights and freedoms established in Article 1(1) of such Convention, prejudicing Mr. Usón Ramírez, due to the restrictions in his exercise of this right. B) On the alleged need to ensure the protection of national security and public order by determining any further liabilities for the exercise of the right to freedom of expression 89. The Commission pointed out that “although the State can impose further liabilities based on “national security”, such liabilities can only be legitimate provided “their genuine purpose and demonstrable effect is to protect the existence of the country against the use or threat of force, to protect its territorial integrity against the use or threat of force, to protect its capacity to react to the use or threat of force, or to protect the personal security of the main governmental officials.” Consequently, it does not suffice to specualte on the possible impact of the order or on hypothetical circumstances resulting from interpretations made by the authorities regarding facts that do not clearly involve a reasonable risk of serious disturbance (“anarchic violence’). A broader or more indeterminate interpretation would open up an inadmissible road to arbitrariness and would clearly restrict freedom of expression that forms an integral part of the public order protected by the American Convention.” 90. The representatives alleged that in this case there was no lawful purpose justifying any further liabilities imposed on the alleged victim, since “the criminal sanction applied to [Mr.] Usón [Ramírez] was not necessary to protect […] the national security that was never threatened.” According to the representatives, “the comments by [Mr.] Usón [Ramírez] were not a threat to national security, their purpose was not to attack any of the elements of which make up the crime, and objectively, they were not enough to threaten the existence of the State or any elements that form the State. Furthermore, they pointed out that the subject matter of the case “was not a confidential or secret matter, whose disclosure would become a threat for national security.” 75 76 Cf. Case of Palamara Iribarne, supra note 47, para. 93. Cf. Case of Vargas Areco v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 155, para. 108.