authorities, prosecutors, other operators of Justice, and relatives of the victims; and use all measures at its disposal to move the process forward.318 231. The Convention of Belém do Pará establishes specific obligations that complement the general obligations of States regarding compliance with the rights enshrined in the American Convention. The Inter-American Court has referred to the State’s enhanced obligation to act with due diligence “when dealing with the case of a woman who is killed or, ill-treated or, whose personal liberty is affected within the framework of a general context of violence against women”319 Thus the Court has indicated that: [...] the general obligations established in Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention are complemented and enhanced for States Parties by the obligations arising from the specific obligations of the Inter-American treaty of the Convention of Belém do Pará. Article 7(b) of this Convention specifically requires the States Parties to apply due diligence to prevent, punish and eradicate violence against women. Thus, when an act of violence is committed against a woman, it is particularly important that the authorities in charge of the investigation conduct it in a resolute and effective manner, taking into account society’s obligation to reject violence against women and the State’s obligation to eliminate it and secure the victims’ trust in the State institutions for their protection. 320 232. In this way, given the special connotation of the due diligence duty in cases of violence against women, the State obligation to effectively investigate these facts has additional scope that includes, among other aspects, a requirement that processes be carried out from a gender perspective.321 The InterAmerican Court has established that the State has an obligation to investigate, ex officio, “the possible genderbased discriminatory connotations of an act of violence perpetrated against a woman,” taking into account not only the possible existence of a context of violence against women in a specific country but “especially when there are specific indications of sexual violence or some type of evidence of cruelty towards the body of the woman.”322 233. Specifically for cases of sexual violence, authorities must weigh the different crucial elements of evidence to establish the facts, beyond the physical indications of injury and witness testimony.323 Also, pursuant to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, investigations and court processes must take into account the various factors that could inhibit the victim from physically resisting a sexual attack, even when the victim has not consented.324 318 Inter-American Court, Case of Carpio Nicolle et al. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 22, 2004. Series C No. 117, para. 134. 319 Inter-American Court. Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, para. 293. 320 Inter-American Court, Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgement of August 31, 2010. Series C No. 216, para. 177. 321 See: Inter-American Court. Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, paras. 293, 455. Also see: IACHR. Report No. 53/13. Case 12,777. Claudina Isabel Velásquez Paiz et al. (Guatemala). Merits. November 4, 2013, para. 117; and IACHR, Access to Justice for women who are Victims of Violence in the Americas, OEA/Ser. L/V/II. doc.68. January 20, 2007, para. 32. 322 Inter-American Court. Case of Véliz Franco et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of May 19, 2014. Series C No. 277, para. 187. 323 IACHR, Access to Justice for Women who are Victims of Violence in the Americas. OEA/SER.L/V/II. Doc. 68. January 20, 2007, para. 136. 324 Specifically, Rule 70 establishes that: a) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim where force, threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a coercive environment undermined the victim’s ability to give voluntary and genuine consent; (b) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim where the victim is incapable of giving genuine consent; (c) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of the silence of, or lack of resistance by, a victim to the alleged sexual violence; (d) Credibility, character or predisposition to sexual availability of a victim or witness cannot be inferred by reason of the sexual nature of the prior or subsequent conduct of a victim or witness. United Nations, Rule 70, Principles of Evidence in Cases of Sexual Violence, International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1(2000).