circumstances, even if there was no physical violence or intimidation, taking advantage of the victim's serious mental illness or lack of intelligence or who was incapable of resisting for any other reason. 57. It is possible to deduce an attempt by the Bolivian State to include the parameter of absence of consent in Article 308, with the addition of "non-consensual sexual acts" in the description of criminal behavior. However, as the judgment highlights, this is an ineffective integration of said criterion, since the qualification of "non-consensual sexual acts" is conditioned to the concurrence of "intimidation, physical or psychological violence", making the requirement of consent redundant. 111 Intimidation and violence always imply, after all, the absence of consent, but the opposite is not correct. Therefore, the inclusion of this parameter did not change the definition of the classification. Thus, the article provides for two forms of rape very similar to its original classification: (i) sexual acts resulting from intimidation or violence, whether physical or psychological, and (ii) sexual acts performed taking advantage of some circumstance that prevents the victim's resistance. Furthermore, as the Court emphasizes, the law “[does not] refer to circumstances in which consent is flawed, such as in cases of evident asymmetry of power between the aggressor and the victim.” 58. The representatives argued that this classification of rape in the Bolivian legal system is incompatible with the Convention and requested the elimination of the criteria of intimidation and violence so that the criterion of consent, which must be clearly defined, prevails. 112 The State, however, maintained that no legislative change was appropriate, either because it had not violated the rights of the victim in the specific case, or because the current classification would be compatible with the Convention. 113 Next, I will explain the reasons that justify granting the measure requested by the victim. b. On the need to truly center the definition of “rape” on the parameter of consent 59. When classifying an act of a sexual nature as a crime, it is necessary to identify (i) what type of conduct must be inhibited and (ii) what conditions must precede the sexual act to assess the conduct as illicit. 114 In Bolivian law, the crime of "rape" includes the following types of conduct: “carnal access,” “anal or vaginal penetration,” and “introduction of objects for libidinous purposes.” The classification of “statutory rape” already covers “carnal access” specifically with those over 14 and under 18 years of age, while other sexual acts not belonging to these categories are addressed in the “sexual abuse” classification (Art. 312 of the Criminal Code). As the Court stated in the judgment, “sexual violence consists of actions of a sexual nature that are committed against a person without their consent, which in addition to including the physical invasion of the human body, can include acts that do not involve penetration or even any physical contact.” 115 60. Thus, the definition of the classifications of sexual conduct that can be classified as sexual crimes in Bolivia seems too restrictive to me. Considering, however, that these categorizations alone did not entail the problems observed in the specific case, I will Cf. Judgment, para. 150. Cf. Brief with Pleadings, Motions and Evidence of November 20, 2020, p. 293, 295. 113 Cf. Answering brief of February 17, 2021, para. 231. 114 Cf. HÖRNLE, Tatiana. #MeToo – Implications for Criminal Law? Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, vol. 6, 2 (2018), p. 124. 115 Cf. Judgment, para. 136. 111 112 19