demonstration of the attempt to resist, requirements that are difficult to demonstrate. This situation is aggravated by the fact that, for various reasons (including fear of reprisals, loss of family support or social stigma), many victims do not immediately report sexual violence. This is especially true for children, who may not realize that acts committed against them constitute a crime. Consequently, victims who are slow to report violence often face difficulty – or even the impossibility – of obtaining physical or medical evidence, such as bodily injuries, to prove that additional physical violence was used during the rape. 67. In the majority of States that have not carried out a substantial reform of the definition of sexual crimes, their definition continues to be based on these outdated concepts. 127 Laws that are not designed to protect the sexual autonomy of citizens are unlikely to be able to do so adequately, so there is a clear need for countries to rethink the classification of sexual crimes under their jurisdiction in order to protect the right to autonomy and negative sexual freedom effectively. 128 Some countries began reforms in this sense starting in the middle of the 20th century. 129 In the last 30 years, the effort to effectively protect these rights has been enhanced with the emergence of the consent criterion. 130 Currently, the majority of States Parties to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1981 (CEDAW) already adopt the parameter of lack of consent to define sexual rape. 131 Some regions, however, continue to lag behind in this process: a 2021 study reveals that, in the American Continent, 23 of the 43 jurisdictions studied still based their classification of rape on the use of force and threats. 132 68. It is essential, at this point, to highlight and deepen the Court's conclusion that the incorporation of the parameter of consent is not only supported, but is required by International Human Rights Law. 133 The Committee in charge of ensuring compliance with CEDAW has already had the opportunity to analyze a case very similar to that of Ms. Losada, which occurred in the Philippines, in which a woman, Ms. Vertido, was raped. 134 The State, however, acquitted the accused after eight years without a first instance decision based on an extremely restrictive and discriminatory interpretation of the criminal classification of "rape". 135 In this context, as noted in the judgment, 136 the CEDAW Committee has highlighted the centrality of consent as a parameter to be evaluated in the investigation of the case in question: Cf. HÖRNLE, Tatiana. #MeToo – Implications for Criminal Law? Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, vol. 6, 2 (2018), p. 123, 126. 128 Cf. HÖRNLE, Tatiana. Sexuelle Selbstbestimmung: Bedeutung, Voraussetzungen und kriminalpolitische Forderungen. Zeitschrift für die gesamten Strafrechtswissenschaften, vol. 127 (2016), p. 851; HÖRNLE, Tatiana. #MeToo – Implications for Criminal Law? Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, vol. 6, 2 (2018), p. 126. 129 Cf. HÖRNLE, Tatiana. #MeToo – Implications for Criminal Law? Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, vol. 6, 2 (2018), p. 125. 130 Cf. Special Rapporteur on violence against women and girls, its causes and consequences (Dubravka Šimonović). Rape as a grave and systematic human rights violation and gender-based violence against women, A/HRC/47/26 (2021), para. 70. 127 Cf. CEDAW. Vertido v. Phillipines, CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008, 2010, para. 8.7. Equality Now. Failure to protect how discriminatory sexual violence laws and practices are hurting women, girls, and adolescents in the Americas. Disponible en: http://www.equalitynow.org/esvamericas. Accessed on November 29, 2022. 133 Cf. Judgment, para. 149. 134 Cf. CEDAW. Vertido v. Phillipines, CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008, 2010. 135 Ibid. 136 Cf. Judgment, para. 146. 131 132 22